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Abstract
In this paper, we show that there exists a balanced linear threshold function (LTF) which is
unique games hard to approximate, refuting a conjecture of Austrin, Benabbas, and Magen. We
also show that the almost monarchy predicate on k variables is approximable for sufficiently
large k.
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1 Introduction
Constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs) are a central topic of study in computer science. A fun-
damental question about CSPs is as follows. Given a CSP where each constraint has the form of
some predicate P and almost all of the constraints can be satisfied, is there a randomized polyno-
mial time algorithm which is guaranteed to do significantly better in expectation than a random
assignment? If so, then we say that the predicate P is approximable. If not, then we say that P is
approximation resistant.
There is a large body of work on this question. On the algorithmic side, Goemans and Williamson’s
[8] breakthrough algorithm for MAX CUT using semidefinite programming implies that all pred-
icates P on two boolean variables are approximable. Ha˚stad [13] later generalized this result,
showing that all 2-CSPs are approximable. For larger arity predicates, many individual predicates
have been shown to be approximable, see e.g. [9, 15, 1], but we have few general criteria for
showing that a predicate is approximable.
On the hardness side, in a breakthrough work Ha˚stad [14] used his 3-bit PCP theorem to prove
that 3-SAT and 3-XOR are NP-hard to approximate. In another breakthrough work, Khot [10]
discovered that if we assume the unique games problem is hard then we can show further inap-
proximability results. Building on this work, Khot, Kindler, Mossel, and O’Donnell [11] showed
that if we assume the unique games problem is hard then the Goemans-Williamson algorithm for
MAX CUT is optimal and Austrin and Mossel [5] showed that any predicate which has a bal-
anced pairwise independent distribution of solutions is unique games hard to approximate. Chan
[6] later strengthened this to NP-hardness under the stronger condition that there exists a pairwise
independent subgroup.
In 2008, Raghavendra [17] proved a dichotomy theorem for the hardness of CSPs. Either a
standard semidefinite program (SDP) gives a better approximation ratio than a random assignment
or it is unique games hard to do so. However, for any given CSP it may be extremely hard to decide
which case holds. In fact, it is not even known whether it is decidable!
In this paper, we investigate the approximability of balanced linear threshold functions (LTFs),
a simple class of predicates for which little was previously known. Prior to this work, it was
an open problem whether there is any balanced LTF which is unique games hard to approximate
(Austrin, Benabbas, and Magen [1] conjectured that there are none) and the only balanced LTFs
which were known to be approximable were the monarchy predicate [1] and LTFs which are close
to the majority function [9].
1.1 Our results
Our main result is the following theorem which refutes the conjecture of Austrin, Benabbas, and
Magen [1].
Definition 1.1. A balanced linear threshold function (LTF) is an LTF with no constant term i.e. a
function of the form f(x1, . . . , xk) = sign(
∑k
i=1 cixi).
Theorem 1.2. There exists a predicate P which is a balanced linear threshold function and is
unique games hard to approximate.
Remark 1.3. This predicate P is very different from other predicates which are known to be unique
games hard to approximate. To the best of our knowledge, for all other predicates P ′ which have
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previously been shown to be unique games hard to approximate, either P ′ has a balanced pairwise
independent distribution of solutions or (like the predicate studied by Guruswami, Lewin, Sudan,
and Trevisan [7]) can be easily reduced to such a predicate. As a consequence, while linear degree
sum of squares lower bounds are known for all other predicates P ′ which have previously been
shown to be unique games hard to approximate, we do not have sum of squares lower bounds for
approximating this predicate P .
We also prove the following approximability result.
Theorem 1.4. The almost monarchy predicate on k variables is approximable if k is sufficiently
large.
1.2 Outline
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give some preliminary defi-
nitions. In section 3 we recall the known criteria for proving that a predicate P is unique games
hard to approximate. In section 4, we construct a balanced LTF which is unique games hard to
approximate, proving our main result.
After proving our main result, we switch gears and analyze balanced LTFs which are approx-
imable. In section 5 we give a description based on the analysis of Khot, Tulsiani, and Worah [16]
for the space of approximation algorithms we should search over. In section 6 we use this descrip-
tion to give a simpler approximation algorithm for the monarchy predicate. Finally, in section 7
we give an approximation algorithm for the almost monarchy predicate on k variables when k is
sufficiently large.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we give some preliminary definitions. In particular, we define what we mean by
predicates, constraints, and approximation resistance and recall the unique games problem and the
unique games conjecture.
Definition 2.1. A boolean predicate P of arity k is a function P : {−1, 1}k → {−1, 1}
Definition 2.2. A boolean constraint C is a function C : {−1,+1}n → {−1,+1}. We say a
boolean constraint C is satisfied by an input x ∈ {−1,+1}n if C(x) = 1.
Definition 2.3. Let P be a boolean predicate. We say that a boolean constraint C : {−1,+1}n →
{−1,+1} has form P if there exists a map φ : [1, k]→ [1, n] and signs (z1, . . . , zk) ∈ {−1,+1}k
such that
C(x1, . . . , xn) = P (z1xφ(1), . . . , zkxφ(k))
Definition 2.4. We say that a boolean predicate P is approximable if there exists an  > 0 such
that there is a polynomial time algorithm which takes a CSP with m constraints of form P as input
and can distinguish between the following two cases:
1. At least (1− )m of the constraints can be satisfied.
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2. At most (rP + )m of the constraints can be satisfied where rP = Ex∈{−1,+1}k
[
P (x)+1
2
]
is the
probability that a random assignment satisfies P .
If neither case holds then the output of the algorithm can be arbitrary. If no such algorithm exists
for any  > 0 then we say that P is approximation resistant.
Currently, we can only show that predicates are approximation resistant under an assumption
such as P 6= NP or the unique games conjecture.
Definition 2.5. We say that a boolean predicate P is NP-hard to approximate if for all  > 0 it
is NP-hard to take a a CSP with m constraints of form P as input and distinguish between the
following two cases:
1. At least (1− )m of the constraints can be satisfied.
2. At most (rP + )m of the constraints can be satisfied where rP = Ex∈{−1,+1}k
[
P (x)+1
2
]
is the
probability that a random assignment satisfies P .
Definition 2.6. In the unique games problem with t labels, we are given a graph G together with
a bijective map φe : [1, t] → [1, t] for each edge e ∈ E(G). We are then asked to assign a label
xv ∈ [1, t] to each vertex v and maximize |e = (v, w) ∈ E(G) : φe(xv) = xw| (i.e. the number of
edge constraints which are satisfied)
Khot [10] made the following conjecture, known as the unique games conjecture
Conjecture 2.7 (Unique Games Conjecture). For all  > 0 there exists a t such that it is NP-hard
to take a unique games problem with t labels and distinguish between the following cases:
1. max{xv}{|e = (v, w) ∈ E(G) : φe(xv) = xw|} ≥ (1 − )|E(G)|. In other words, at least
(1− )|E(G)| of the edge constraints can be satisfied.
2. max{xv}{|e = (v, w) ∈ E(G) : φe(xv) = xw|} ≤ |E(G)|. In other words, at most |E(G)|
of the edge constraints can be satisfied.
Definition 2.8. We say that a predicate P is unique games hard to approximate if for any 1 > 0
and integer t there exists an 2 > 0 such that there is a polynomial time reduction from the problem
of taking a unique games instance with t labels and distinguishing between the following two
cases:
1. At least (1− 1)|E(G)| edge constraints can be satisfied.
2. At most 1|E(G)| edge constraints can be satisfied.
to the problem of taking a CSP on m constraints where the predicates have form P and distin-
guishing between the following two cases:
1. At least (1− 2)m of the constraints can be satisfied.
2. At most (rP + 2)m of the constraints can be satisfied where rP = Ex∈{−1,+1}k
[
P (x)+1
2
]
is
the probability that a random assignment satisfies P .
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3 Criteria for Approximation Resistance
In this section, we recall known criteria for proving that a predicate P is unique games hard to
approximate and define perfect integrality gap instances, which is a special case of Raghavenra’s
criterion as is the criterion we will use.
3.1 The standard SDP for CSPs
We first recall the standard SDP described by Raghavendra [17] which gives an approximation
ratio better than the random assignment whenever it is not unique games hard to do so.
The idea behind the SDP is as follows. The SDP searches for a set of global biases and pairwise
biases B = {bi : i ∈ [1, n]} ∪ {bij : i, j ∈ [1, n], i < j} for the variables where each possible B is
evaluated as follows. For each constraint C, we find a distribution of assignments to the variables
involved in C which matches B and maximizes the probability that C is satisfied. This probability
is the score of B on the constraint C. The goal of the SDP is to find a B which maximizes the sum
of the scores of B on all of the constraints.
To make this rigorous, we make the following definitions.
Definition 3.1. Given x = (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ {−1,+1}k, we define the point px ∈ {−1,+1}k+(
k
2) to
be
px = (xi : i ∈ [1, k]) concatenated with (xi1xi2 : i1, i2 ∈ [1, k], i1 < i2)
where the pairs i1, i2 are in lexicographical order.
Definition 3.2. Given the biases and pairwise biases B = {bi} ∪ {bij} and a set of indices I =
{i1, . . . , ik} in increasing order, we define the point pB,I ∈ Rk+(
k
2) to be
pB,I = (bij : j ∈ [1, k]) concatenated with (bij1 ij2 : j1, j2 ∈ [1, k], j1 < j2)
where the pairs j1, j2 are in lexicographical order.
Definition 3.3. Given a set of points X = {p1, . . . , pm}, we define
H(X) = {
m∑
i=1
aipi : ∀i ∈ [1,m], ai ∈ [0, 1],
m∑
i=1
ai = 1}
to be the convex hull of the points in X .
Definition 3.4. Given a constraint C on k variables {xi1 , . . . , xik}, we define the KTW polytope
KTWC of C to be
KTWC = H({px : x = (xi1 , . . . , xik) ∈ {−1,+1}k, C(x) = 1})
Also, we define the polytope ALLk to be
ALLk = H({px : x = (xi1 , . . . , xik) ∈ {−1,+1}k})
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Remark 3.5. We call this polytope the KTW polytope because Khot, Tulsiani, and Worah [16]
highlighted the central role this polytope plays in determining whether a predicate P is strongly
approximation resistant or not. That said, it should be noted that similar polytopes appeared in
previous papers (see e.g. [2, 3, 4]).
Definition 3.6. We now define the standard SDP for a set of constraints {C1, . . . , Cm} on variables
{x1, . . . , xn}. We have the following variables:
1. We have variables {bi : i ∈ [1, n]} and {bij : i, j ∈ [1, n], i < j}. We take the matrix B so
that
(a) B00 = 1
(b) ∀i ∈ [1, n], B0i = Bi0 = bi
(c) ∀i ∈ [1, n], Bii = 1
(d) For all i, j ∈ [1, n] such that i < j, Bij = Bji = bij
2. For each constraint Ci, we have variables aCi1, aCi2, pCi1, pCi2
With these variables, we are trying to maximize
∑m
i=1 aCi1 subject to the following constraints:
1. B  0
2. For each i ∈ [1,m],
(a) aCi1, aCi2 ∈ [0, 1], aCi1 + aCi2 = 1
(b) pCi1 ∈ KTWCi , pCi2 ∈ ALLki where ki is the arity of the constraint Ci
(c) pB,Ii = aCi1pCi1 + aCi2pCi2 where Ii = {ij : j ∈ [1, ki]} is the set of indices which Ci
depends on.
Raghavendra [17] proved the following theorem:
Theorem 3.7. A predicate P is unique games hard to approximate if and only if for all  > 0 there
is a CSP instance with m constraints of the form P such that
1. The standard SDP gives a value of at least (1− )m.
2. At most (rP + )m of the constraints can be satisfied where rP is the probability that a
random assignment satisfies the predicate P .
3.2 The KTW criterion
Khot, Tulsiani, and Worah [16] found an alternative criterion for showing that a predicate P is
unique games hard to approximate. That said, the KTW criterion doesn’t quite match Raghaven-
dra’s criterion. Rather, the KTW criterion corresponds to the slightly stronger statement that P is
unique games hard to weakly approximate.
Definition 3.8. We say that a boolean predicate P is weakly approximable if there exists an  > 0
such that there is a polynomial time algorithm which takes a CSP with m constraints of form P as
input and can distinguish between the following two cases:
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1. At least (1− )m of the constraints can be satisfied.
2. Every x satisfies between (rP−)m and (rP+)m of the constraints where rP = Ex∈{−1,+1}k
[
P (x)+1
2
]
is the probability that a random assignment satisfies P . In other words, no assignment does
much better or worse than random.
If neither case holds then the output of the algorithm can be arbitrary. If no such algorithm exists
for any  > 0 then we say that P is strongly approximation resistant.
Definition 3.9. We say that a predicate P is unique games hard to weakly approximate if for any
1 > 0 and integer t there exists an 2 > 0 such that there is a polynomial time reduction from the
problem of taking a unique games instance with t labels and distinguishing between the following
two cases:
1. At least (1− 1)|E(G)| edge constraints can be satisfied.
2. At most 1|E(G)| edge constraints can be satisfied.
to the problem of taking a CSP on m constraints where the predicates have form P and distin-
guishing between the following two cases:
1. At least (1− 2)m of the constraints can be satisfied.
2. All assignments satisfy between (rP−2)m and (rP+2)m contraints where rP = Ex∈{−1,+1}k
[
P (x)+1
2
]
is the probability that a random assignment satisfies P .
To write down the KTW criterion, we need the following definitions from [16]:
Definition 3.10. For a measure Λ on KTWP and a subset S ⊆ [1, k], let ΛS denote the projection
of Λ onto the coordinates of S. For a permutation pi : S → S and a choice of signs z ∈ {−1, 1}|S|,
let ΛS,pi,z denote the measure ΛS after permuting the the indices in S according to pi and then
(possibly) negating the coordinates according to multiplication by {zi}i∈S
Definition 3.11 (Definition 1.1 of KTW [16]). LetAs be the family of all predicates (of all arities)
: {−1, 1}k → {0, 1} such that there is a probability measure Λ on KTWP such that for every
1 ≤ t ≤ k, the signed measure
Λ
(t)
P := ES:|S|=tEpi:[1,t]→[1,t]E(z1,...,zt)∈{−1,1}t
[(
t∏
i=1
zi
)
· PˆS · ΛS,pi,z
]
vanishes identically. If so, Λ itself is said to vanish.
Khot, Tulsiani, and Worah [16] prove the following theorem
Theorem 3.12. A predicate P is unique games hard to weakly approximate if and only if P ∈ As
Remark 3.13. The KTW criterion has the advantage that it can be expressed only in terms of the
polytope KTWP and the Fourier characters of P , but like Raghavendra’s criterion, it is unknown
whether it is even decidable.
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3.3 Unique Games Hardness of Approximation from a Balanced Pairwise
Independent Distribution of Solutions
We now observe (as has been observed before) that if a predicate has a balanced pairwise indepe-
dent distribution of solutions, which was shown to imply unique games hardness by Austrin and
Mossel [5], then it satisfies both of Raghavendra’s criterion and the KTW criterion.
Definition 3.14. Let P : {−1, 1}k → {−1,+1} be a boolean predicate. We say that a distribution
D is a balanced pairwise independent distribution of solutions for P if
1. D is supported on {x ∈ {−1, 1}k : P (x) = 1}
2. For all i ∈ [1, k], ED[xi] = 0
3. For all distinct i, j ∈ [1, k], ED[xixj] = 0
Example 3.15. Consider the 3-XOR predicate P (x1, x2, x3) = x1x2x3. The uniform distribution
on the four solutions (1, 1, 1), (1,−1,−1), (−1, 1,−1), (−1,−1, 1) is a balanced pairwise inde-
pendent distribution of solutions for P .
Lemma 3.16. If a predicate P has a balanced pairwise independent distribution of solutions then
it satisfies both Raghavendra’s criterion for being unique games hard to approximate and the KTW
criterion for being unique games hard to weakly approximate.
Proof. To see that P satisfies Raghavendra’s criterion for being unique games hard to approximate,
consider the instance with the 2k constraints {P (b1x1, . . . , bkxk) = 1 : (b1, . . . , bk) ∈ {−1, 1}k}
and observe that
1. Every assignment satisfies exactly 2krP constraints where rP is the probability that a random
assignment satisfies P .
2. The standard SDP has value 2k and this can be achieved by setting bi = 0 for all i and bij = 0
for all i < j.
To see that P satisfies the KTW criterion for being unique games hard to weakly approximate, note
that having a pairwise independent distribution of solutions implies that ~0 ∈ KTWP so we can
take Λ to be the probability measure which is ~0 with probability 1. We now have that
Λ
(t)
P = ES:|S|=tEpi:[1,t]→[1,t]E(z1,...,zt)∈{−1,1}t
[(
t∏
i=1
zi
)
· PˆS · ΛS,pi,z
]
= 0
because ΛS,pi,z will always be the measure which is ~0 with probability 1.
3.4 Perfect Integrality Gap Instances
While the criterion of having a balanced pairwise independent distribution of solutions is simple
and powerful, it does not capture all predicates P which are unique games hard to approximate and
we need a stronger criterion. The criterion we use is that there is a perfect integrality gap instance
for the standard SDP which consists of functions of the form P .
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Definition 3.17. Let {fa : a ∈ [1,m]} be a multi-set of ±1-valued functions on {−1,+1}n where
each fa depends on a subset Va ⊆ {x1, . . . , xn} of the variables. We say that {fa : a ∈ [1,m]} is
a perfect integrality gap instance for the standard SDP if
1. There exist biases and pairwise biases B = {bi, i ∈ [1, n]} ∪ {bij : i, j ∈ [1, n], i < j} such
that for all a, there exists a distribution Da on satisfying assigments to fa which matches B,
i.e.
(a) ∀i ∈ Va, EDa [xi] = bi
(b) For all i, j ∈ Vi such that i < j, EDa [xixj] = bij
2.
∑m
a=1 fa(x1, . . . , xn) = cm for some constant c ∈ [−1, 1]
For brevity, we will just say “perfect integrality gap instance” and omit writing “for the standard
SDP”
Remark 3.18. In this paper, it is sufficient to consider perfect integrality gap instances where all
of the functions fa are constraints on the same set of variables x1, . . . , xk. However, we do not
require this in the definition.
Example 3.19. As shown in the previous subsection, if P : {−1,+1}k → {−1,+1} is a predicate
which has a balanced pairwise independent distribtion of solutions then {P (b1x1, . . . , bkxk) :
(b1, . . . , bk) ∈ {−1, 1}k} is a perfect integrality gap instance.
Example 3.20. The predicate P (x1, x2, x3, x4) = −1−x12 x2x3 − 1+x12 x2x4 was shown to be NP-
hard to approximate by Guruswami, Lewin, Sudan, and Trvisan [7]. This predicate does not have
a pairwise independent distribution of solutions but {P (x1, x2, x3, x4), P (x1,−x2, x3, x4)} is a
perfect integrality gap instance because
1. For all (x1, x2, x3, x4) ∈ {−1,+1}4, exactly one of P (x1, x2, x3, x4) and P (x1,−x2, x3, x4)
will be 1.
2. Taking the biases and pairwise biases B = {bi : i ∈ [1, 4]} ∪ {bij : i, j ∈ [1, 4], i <
j} to all be zero except for b34 = −1, if we take D1 to be the uniform distribution on
{(1, 1, 1,−1), (1,−1,−1, 1), (−1, 1,−1, 1), (−1,−1, 1,−1)} and takeD2 to be the uniform
distribution on {(−1, 1, 1,−1), (1,−1, 1,−1), (1, 1,−1, 1), (−1,−1,−1, 1)} then D1 is a
distribution of solutions to P (x1, x2, x3, x4) = 1 which matches B and D2 is a distribution
of solutions to P (x1,−x2, x3, x4) = 1 which matches B.
Remark 3.21. While the GLST predicate does not have a balanced pairwise indepedent distri-
bution of solutions, if we set x4 = −x3 then it becomes the 3-XOR predicate, so its hardness
essentially comes from the hardness of 3-XOR.
Lemma 3.22. If there is a perfect integrality gap insatnce {fa : a ∈ [1,m]} of functions of form
P then P satisfies both Raghavendra’s criterion for being unique games hard to approximate and
the KTW criterion for being unique games hard to weakly approximate.
Proof. If there is a perfect integrality gap instance {fa : a ∈ [1,m]} of functions of form P then
Raghavendra’s criterion for being unique games hard to approximate is satisfied by definition. In
particular,
9
1. Every assignment satisfies exactlymrP constraints where rP is the probability that a random
assignment satisfies P .
2. The standard SDP has value m and this can be achieved with the given biases {bi} and
pairwise biases {bij}
The proof that the KTW criterion is satisfied requires carefully putting the definitions together.
Since this is somewhat technical, we defer this proof to Appendix A.
4 An approximation resistant LTF
In this section, we construct a predicate P which is a balanced linear threshold function and is
unique games hard to approximate.
4.1 Overview of the construction
4.1.1 High level overview
The high level idea for our construction is as follows
1. The core of our construction is a predicate P = sign(l) (where l is a linear form) together
with a set of constraints of the form P which gives a perfect integrality gap for the standard
SDP (generalized to bounded integer valued variables) with the following adjustments:
(a) Rather than considering all possible solutions, we only consider solutions from some
set V .
(b) The variables may take integer values rather than just values in {−1,+1}.
2. We handle the first adjustment by adding constraints to our linear form l which are only
satisfed by our subset V of possible solutions. However, for technical reasons this gives us
two predicates P1 = sign(l1) and P2 = sign(l2) instead of just one predicate.
3. We handle the second adjustment by encoding our variables in unary.
4. From the two predicates P1 = sign(l1) and P2 = sign(l2), we obtain a single predicate
P3 = sign(l3) which “simulates” both P1 and P2. This predicate P3 is our balanced LTF
which is unique games hard to approximate.
4.1.2 Technical overview
More precisely, we will construct an approximation resistant balanced LTF as follows:
1. In subsection 4.2, we find a set of linear forms {la} together with a set of possible solution
vectors V in Zk (but not necessarily in {−1,+1}k) such that
(a) There exist values {ci}, {cii}, {cij} such that for all a, there is a distribution Da over
the vectors {v : v ∈ V, la(v) > 0} such that ∀i, EDa [vi] = ci, ∀i, EDa [v2i ] = cii, and
∀i < j, EDa [vivj] = cij
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(b) For every vector v ∈ V , la(v) > 0 for exactly half of the {la}.
In other words, {sign(la)} would be a perfect integrality gap instance except for the follow-
ing issues:
(a) Instead of considering all possible inputs, we only consider a subset V of the possible
inputs.
(b) The input vectors in V have entries in Z rather than {−1,+1}
All of these linear forms la will be the same as some linear form l up to permuting the
variables.
2. In subsections 4.3 and 4.4, we show how to obtain new linear forms {l′a1} ∪ {l′a2} and a set
solution vectors V ′ such that
(a) If v′ /∈ V ′ then for all a, l′a1(v′)l′a2(v′) < 0.
(b) For all a, σ and all vb ∈ V there is a vector v′bσ ∈ V ′ such that l′a1(v′bσ) = l′a2(v′bσ) =
la(vb)
(c) There exist values {c′i}, {c′ii}, {c′ij} such that for all a, there is a distributionD′a over the
vectors {v′ : v′ ∈ {v′bσ}, l′a1(v′) > 0, l′a2(v′) > 0} such that ∀i, E[v′i] = c′i, ∀i, E[v′2i ] =
c′ii, and ∀i < j, E[v′iv′j] = c′ij
In other words, the linear forms {l′a1} ∪ {l′a2} will test whether v′ is in the set of specified
solution vectors V ′. If not, then v will automatically make exactly half of the linear forms
{l′a1} ∪ {l′a2} positive. If v′ is in the set of possible solution vectors then the linear forms
{l′a1}∪ {l′a2} will behave like the linear forms {la}. Since each solution vector v ∈ V makes
exactly half of the linear forms {la} positive, this implies that every v′ makes exactly half of
the linear forms {l′a1} ∪ {l′a2} positive.
Thus, taking the linear forms {l′a1} ∪ {l′a2} fixes the issue of considering only a subset of the
possible inputs. However, there is now a new issue. The linear forms {l′a1} will be the same
as some linear form l′1 up to permuting the variables and the linear forms {l′a2} will be the
same as some linear form l′2 up to permuting the variables but we will not have l
′
1 = l
′
2. Thus,
we will have two different LTFs.
3. In subsection 4.5, we describe how we can make our vectors have ±1 values by expressing
all of the coordinates in unary. We also make our linear threshold functions balanced by
replacing 1 with a special variable xone which we always expect to be 1.
4. Finally, in subsections 4.7 and 4.8 we describe how to take two different balanced linear
forms l1 and l2 on {x1, . . . , xk} where k is a power of 2 (we need this condition for technical
reasons) and construct a third balanced linear form l3 on {x1, . . . , xk2} such that given a
perfect integrality gap instance {fa} where each fa is on the variables {x1, . . . , xk} and has
the form sign(l1) or sign(l2), we can construct a perfect integrality gap instance {f ′b} where
each f ′b is on the variables {x1, . . . , xk2} and has the form sign(l3)
Putting everything together, the predicate sign(l3) is unique games hard to weakly approximate.
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4.2 Core of the construction
As described in the overview, the core of the construction is a predicate P = sign(l) (where l is
a linear form) together with a set of constraints of form P which gives a perfect integrality gap
instance for the standard SDP (generalized to bounded integer valued variables) with the following
adjustments:
1. We restrict our attention to a subset V of the possible solution vectors.
2. The variables may take integer values rather than just values in {−1,+1}.
More precisely, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4.1. There exists a set of linear forms {la}, a set of possible solution vectors V , and values
{ci}, {cii}, {cij} such that
1. ∀v ∈ V, Prl∈{la}[sign(l(v)) > 0] = 12
2. For all a there exists a distribution Da such that
(a) Da is supported on the set {v : v ∈ V, la(v) > 0}
(b) ∀i, Ev∈Da [vi] = ci
(c) ∀i, Ev∈Da [v2i ] = cii
(d) ∀i, j, Ev∈Da [vivj] = cij
In fact, we may take V and the values {ci}, {cii}, {cij} to be symmetric under permutations of the
input variables and have that all of the {la} are the same as some linear form l up to permuting
the input variables.
Proof. We can take the following linear forms {la}, solution vectors V , and values {ci}, {cii}, {cij}
1. {la} = {x1 + 1.5 − 1.6(x2 + x3)/299, x2 + 1.5 − 1.6(x3 + x4)/299, x3 + 1.5 − 1.6(x1 +
x4)/299, x4 + 1.5− 1.6(x1 + x2)/299}
2. V is the set of all permutations of the following vectors:
{(299, 0, 0, 0), (−1,−1,−7,−7), (64,−1,−2,−2)}
3. ∀i, ci = 0, ∀i, cii = 13455004500 = 299, and ∀i 6= j, cij = 0
We first check condition 1.
For the vector (299, 0, 0, 0), x1 + 1.5− 1.6(x2 +x3)/299 and x2 + 1.5− 1.6(x3 +x4)/299 will
be positive while x3 +1.5−1.6(x1 +x4)/299 and x4 +1.5−1.6(x1 +x2)/299 will be negative. By
symmetry, condition 1 holds for the vector (0, 299, 0, 0), (0, 0, 299, 0), and (0, 0, 0, 299) as well.
For all other vectors, the maximum magnitude of the sum of two coordinates is 63. Since
63
299
< 1
4
, the sign of the linear form is determined by whether the coordinate with weight 1 has
value at least−1 or has value at most−2. Since all of the other vectors have two coordinates which
are at least −1 and two coordinates which are at most −2, condition 1 holds for all of vectors in
{vb}, as needed.
For the second condition we can take the following distribution for the linear form l = x1 +
1.5− 1.6(x2 + x3)/299:
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1. Take (299, 0, 0, 0) with probability 15
4500
2. Take (−1,−1,−7,−7) with probability 1196
4500
, take (−1,−7,−1,−7) with probability 1196
4500
,
and take (−1,−7,−7,−1) with probability 1196
4500
3. Take (−1, 64,−2,−2) with probability 299
4500
, take (−1,−2, 64,−2) with probability 299
4500
,
and take (−1,−2,−2, 64) with probability 299
4500
With this distribution, we have the following expectation values:
1. E[v1] = 14500(299 ∗ 15− 1196 ∗ 3− 299 ∗ 3) = 0
2. E[v2] = 14500(−1196 ∗ (1 + 7 + 7) + 299 ∗ (64− 2− 2)) = 0
3. E[v1v2] = 14500(1196 ∗ 1 ∗ (1 + 7 + 7)− 299 ∗ 1 ∗ (64− 2− 2)) = 0
4. E[v2v3] = 14500(1196 ∗ (7 + 7 + 49)− 299 ∗ (128 + 128− 4)) = 0
5. E[v21] =
1
4500
(15 ∗ (299)2 + 1196 ∗ 3 + 299 ∗ 3) = 1345500
4500
= 299
6. E[v22] =
1
4500
(1196 ∗ (1 + 49 + 49) + 299 ∗ ((64)2 + 4 + 4)) = 1345500
4500
= 299
By symmetry, the remaining expectation values match as well and we can take similar distributions
for the other linear forms.
Remark 4.2. We give some intution for how we found this core in Appendix B
4.3 Constraints and LTFs
In order to obtain a perfect integrality gap instance from this core, we have to fix the following two
problems:
1. A priori, we can take any vector v, not just the vectors in V
2. Our variables are not boolean.
To fix these problems, we will add constraints to our LTFs in a way such that if the constraints are
not satisfied, then we automatically satisfy precisely 1
2
of our LTFs.
Definition 4.3. Given a linear form l, let Z(l) = {x : l(x) = 0}
Proposition 4.4. Let lconstraint and lremainder be two linear forms. For all sufficiently large B, if
we take the linear forms l′1 = Blconstraint + lremainder and l
′
2 = −Blconstraint + lremainder then
1. If x ∈ Z(lconstraint) then sign(l′1(x)) = sign(l′2(x)) = sign(lremainder(x)).
2. If x /∈ Z(lconstraint) then l′1(x)l′2(x) < 0.
Proof. The first statement is trivial. For the second statement, let a = min {|lconstraint(x)| : lconstraint(x) 6= 0}
and let b = max {|lremainder(x)|}. Now note that as long as B > ba and x /∈ Z(lconstraint), the sign
of l′1(x) and l
′
2(x) is completely determined by the sign of lconstraint(x)
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Using this proposition, if we take two copies of each linear form li and add ±Blconstraint to
these copies for a sufficiently large B then we will automatically satisfy half of our constraints
unless lconstraint(x) = 0, in which case the answer is unchanged. This allows us to enforce the
constraint that x ∈ Zlconstraint which is quite powerful.
Example 4.5. If we take lconstraint = x1 +x2 +x3− 2x4−x5 where x1, x2, x3, x4, x5 ∈ {−1,+1}
then Z(lconstraint) = {x : x4 = sign(x1 + x2 + x3), x5 = x1x2x3}
As shown by the following proposition, we can easily take the AND of multiple constraints.
Proposition 4.6. For any linear forms l1 and l2, for all sufficiently large constantsB, Z(Bl1+l2) =
Z(l1) ∩ Z(l2)
Remark 4.7. We have to be careful when adding constraints with new variables because in order to
show that the resulting LTFs are a perfect integrality gap instance, we will have to give expectation
values and pairwise expectation values for the new variables.
Remark 4.8. The LTFs sign(Blconstraint(x)+lremainder(x)) and sign(−Blconstraint(x)+lremainder(x))
may not have the same form. This is why we will need additional ideas to find a perfect integrality
gap instance where all of the {fi} have the same form P which is a balanced LTF.
4.4 Specifying potential solution vectors
In this subsection, we show how to use constraints to restrict the set of possible vectors to an
arbitrary set of vectors V = {v1, · · · , vm}.
Lemma 4.9. Given a set of linear forms {la}, a set of possible solution vectors V , and values
{ci}, {cii}, {cij} such that for all a, there is a distrubution Da such that:
1. Da is supported on the set {v : v ∈ V, la(v) > 0}
2. ∀i, Ev∈Da [vi] = ci
3. ∀i, Ev∈Da [v2i ] = cii
4. ∀i, j, Ev∈Da [vivj] = cij
we can construct sets of linear forms {l′a1} ∪ {l′a2}, a set of solution vectors V ′, and values
{c′i}, {c′ii}, {c′ij} such that
1. If v′ /∈ V ′ then for all a, l′a1(v′)l′a2(v′) < 0.
2. For all a, σ and all vb ∈ V there is a vector v′bσ ∈ V ′ such that l′a1(v′bσ) = l′a2(v′bσ) = la(vb).
3. For all a there exists a distribution D′a such that
(a) D′a is supported on the set {v′ : v′ ∈ V ′, l′a1(v′) > 0}
(b) ∀i, Ev′∈D′a [v′i] = c′i
(c) ∀i, Ev′∈D′a [v′2i ] = c′ii
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(d) ∀i, j, Ev′∈D′a [v′iv′j] = c′ij
Moreover, if V and the values {ci}, {cii}, {cij} are symmetric under permutations of the input vari-
ables and the linear forms {la} are the same as some linear form l up to permuting the variables
then we may take {l′a1} ∪ {l′a2} so that all of the {l′a1} are the same as some linear form l′1 up to
permuting the variables and all of the {l′a2} are the same as sone linear form l′2 up to permuting
the variables.
Proof. The intution is as follows. We specify the set of vectors V as possible solution vectors. We
then use permutation gadgets to ensure that our final vector v is one of the these vectors but we
don’t know which one.
Definition 4.10. We define a permutation gadget P (x1, · · · , xm) on variables x1, · · · , xm to con-
sist of the following variables and constraints. For the variables, we have
1. Initial variables x1, · · · , xm which are integers in the range [−B,B] for some bound B.
2. Output variables y1, · · · , ym which are integers in the range [−B,B]
3. Permutation indicators {pij : i, j ∈ [1,m]} which are either 0 or 1. We want pij = 1 if i is
mapped to j and pij = 0 otherwise.
4. Variables {d+ij, d−ij : i, j ∈ [1,m]} which are integers in the range [−2B, 2B]. We want
d+ij−d−ij
2
= yj − xi
For the constraints, we have
1. ∀i,∑j pij = 1
2. ∀j,∑i pij = 1
3. ∀i, j, d
+
ij−d−ij
2
= yj − xi
4. ∀i, j, d+ij + d−ij = 4Bpij . This implies that ∀i, j, d+ij = d−ij = 2B whenever pij = 1
Proposition 4.11. If the constraints are satisfied then y1, · · · , ym must be a permutation of x1, · · · , xm
Similarly, we can construct a permutation gadget for vectors
Definition 4.12. We define a permutation gadget P (v1, · · · , vm) on vectors v1, · · · , vm to consist
of the following variables and constraints. For the variables, we have
1. Initial variables (v11, · · · , v1n), · · · , (vm1, · · · , vmn) which are integers in the range [−B,B]
for some bound B.
2. Output variables (w11, · · · , w1n), · · · , (wm1, · · · , wmn) which are integers in the range [−B,B]
3. Permutation indicators {pij : i, j ∈ [1,m]} which are either 0 or 1. We want pij = 1 if i is
mapped to j and pij = 0 otherwise.
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4. Variables {d+ijk, d−ijk : i, j ∈ [1,m], k ∈ [1, n]} which are integers in the range [−2B, 2B].
We want
d+ijk−d−ijk
2
= vjk − wik
For the constraints, we have
1. ∀i,∑j pij = 1
2. ∀j,∑i pij = 1
3. ∀i, j, k, d
+
ijk−d−ijk
2
= vjk − wik
4. ∀i, j, k, d+ijk + d−ijk = 4Bpij . This implies that ∀i, j, k, d+ijk = d−ijk = 2B whenever pij = 1
Proposition 4.13. If the constraints are satisfied thenw1, · · · , wm must be a permutation of v1, · · · , vm
We now describe our construction.
1. We take V = {v1, · · · , vm} to be the set of possible solution vectors
2. We take the permutation gadget P (v1, · · · , vm)
3. We take a second permutation gadget P (v′1, · · · , v′m) where v′1, · · · , v′m = w1, · · · , wm are
the output vectors of the first permutation gadget.
4. We take a third permutation gadget P (v′′1 , · · · , v′′m) where v′′1 , · · · , v′′m = w′1, · · · , w′m are the
output vectors of the second permutation gadget.
5. We take w′′1 , · · · , w′′m to be the output vectors of the third permutation gadget.
6. To obtain the non-constraint part of the linear forms {l′a1} and {l′a2}, we apply the linear
form la to w′′1
We take D′a to be the following distribution. We start with the distribution Da for w
′′
1 . Whenever
we have that w′′1 = vi, we take the uniform distribution over all triples of permutations σ, σ
′, σ′′
such that σ′′ ◦σ′ ◦σ(i) = 1. The following lemma implies that we can find the values c′ as needed.
Lemma 4.14. For the distribution D′a, all expectation values and pairwise expectation values
depend only on the values {E[w′′1i] = ci}, {E[(w′′1i)2] = cii}, and {E[w′′1iw′′1j] = cij}.
Proof. We first observe that we do not need to consider the variables d+ijk and d
−
ijk. To see this,
note that we can make the substitutions d+ijk = 2Bpij + vjk − wik and d−ijk = 2Bpij − vjk + wik
and use linearity. Following similar logic, we do not need to consider the variables d′+ijk, d
′−
ijk, d
′′+
ijk,
or d′′−ijk either.
To analyze the remaining variables, we take ai = Ev∈{v1,...,vm}[vi] and aij = Ev∈{v1,...,vm}[vivj].
Looking at the expected values, we have that
1. The values {vik} are fixed
2. ∀i, j, E[pij] = E[p′ij] = E[p′′ij] = 1m
3. ∀i, k, E[v′ik] = E[v′′ik] = ak
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v1 v2 . . . vm
v′1 v′2 . . . v′m
v′′1 v′′2 . . . v′′m
w′′1 w′′2 . . . w′′m
Possible solution vectors V
Permutation gadget 1
Permutation gadget 2
Permutation gadget 3
la is applied to w
′′
1
Figure 1: This figure illustrates our construction of the linear forms l′a1 and l
′
a2
4. For all i 6= 1 and all k, E[w′′ik] = mm−1ak − ckm−1 because E[w′′1k] = ck and we must have that∑k
i=1 w
′′
ik = m(ak)
We now observe that the only pairs of variables which are not pairwise independent are pairs of
permutation indicators in the same permutation gadget and pairs of coordinates from vectors in
the same set {v′1, · · · , v′m}, {v′′1 , · · · , v′′m}, or {w′′1 , · · · , w′′m}. For pairs of permutation indicators
in the same permutation gadget, pairs of coordinates of vectors in the set {v′1, · · · , v′m}, and pairs
of coordinates of vectors in the set {v′′1 , · · · , v′′m}, the pairwise expectation values will be the same
regardless of the distribution of w′′1 . Thus, we just need to consider pairs of coordinates of vectors
in the set {w′′1 , · · · , w′′m} and we obtain the following expected values:
1. E[w′′1iw
′′
2j] =
m
m−1ajci − cijm−1 because
m∑
k=2
E[w′′1iw
′′
kj] = majE[w
′′
1i]− E[w′′1iw′′1j] = majci − cij
2. E[w′′2iw
′′
2j] =
m
m−1aij − cijm−1 because
m∑
k=2
E[w′′2iw
′′
2j] =
m∑
k=1
E[w′′kiw
′′
kj]− E[w′′1iw′′1j] = maij − cij
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3. E[w′′2iw
′′
3j] =
m2aiaj−majci−maicj−maij+2cij
(m−1)(m−2) because
n∑
k=3
E[w′′2iw
′′
kj] = majE[w
′′
2i]− E[w′′2iw′′2j]− E[w′′2iw′′1j]
=
m2
m− 1aiaj −
mciaj
m− 1 −
(
m
m− 1aij −
cij
m− 1
)
−
(
m
m− 1aicj −
cij
m− 1
)
=
m2aiaj −majci −maicj −maij + 2cij
m− 1
To see the moreover part, we make the following observation. Observe that the set of con-
straints we are adding is symmetric under permutations of the k indices (which corresponds to
permutations of the input variables to the core). Thus, letting lconstraint be a linear form enforcing
the constraints, instead of adding and subtracting lconstraint to each la to obtain the linear forms
l′a1 and l
′
a2, we can instead add and subtract lconstraint to a single la to obtain the corresponding l
′
a1
and l′a2 and then for all a
′ 6= a we can apply the corresponding permutation of the k indices which
maps la to la′ to l′a1 and l
′
a2 to obtain the linear forms l
′
a′1 and l
′
a′2
Remark 4.15. We need 3 consecutive permutation gadgets so that almost all pairs of variables
(excluding the d+ijk and d
−
ijk variables) will be pairwise independent. If we only had one permu-
tation gadget, we would have to have that pi1 is always 0 whenever vi is not in the support of
our distribution. Similarly, if we only had two permutation gadgets, we would have to have that
pijp
′
j1 = 0 whenever vi is not in the support of our distribution.
4.5 Expressing variables in unary
So far we have worked with variables xi which take integer values in some range [a, b] where
a, b ∈ Z. We now describe how to replace these variables using ±1 variables.
Definition 4.16. We define a variable xone which is always supposed to be 1. In particular, in all
distributions we take E[xone] = 1 and we take E[xonexi] = E[xi] for every variable xi
Remark 4.17. If every assignment where xone = 1 satisfies exactly half of the balanced LTFs then
by symmetry, every assignment satisfies exactly half of the balanced LTFs. Thus, without loss of
generality we can assume that xone is always 1.
Lemma 4.18. Given variables xi which takes integer values in some range [ai, bi] where a, b ∈ Z,
we can replace each xi with bi+ai2 xone +
1
2
∑bi−ai
k=1 yik where the {yik} are ±1 variables. Moreover,
given a distribution D such that
1. ∀i, ED[xi] = ci
2. ∀i, ED[x2i ] = cii
3. ∀i < j, ED[xixj] = cij
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there is a distribution D′ on the variables {yik} such that
1. ∀i,∀k,ED′ [yik] = 2ci−bi+aibi−ai
2. ∀i,∀k,ED′ [y2ik] = 1
3. ∀i,∀k1, k2, ED′ [yik1yik2 ] = 2cii−2ci−
(bi+ai)
2
2
+bi+ai− (bi−ai)2
(bi−ai)(bi−ai−1)
4. ∀i < j, ∀k1, k2, ED′ [yik1yjk2 ] = 4cij−2(bi+ai)cj−2(bj+aj)ci+(bi+ai)(bj+ai)(bi−ai)(bj−aj)
Proof. For given values of {xi}, for each i we randomly choose 2xi − bi − ai of the variables yik
to be 1 and 2bi − 2xi of the variables yik to be −1. Applying this to all of the possible values {xi}
in D, we obtain the distribution D′. We now make the following computations (where we replace
xone by 1 throughout).
1.
xi =
bi + ai
2
+
1
2
bi−ai∑
k=1
yik
By symmetry, for a given xi,
E[yik] =
2xi − bi + ai
bi − ai
Taking the expected value over D,
ED′ [yik] =
2ci − bi + ai
bi − ai
2.
x2i =
(
bi + ai
2
+
1
2
bi−ai∑
k=1
yik
)2
=
(bi + ai)
2
4
+
1
2
bi−ai∑
k=1
yik +
1
4
bi−ai∑
k=1
y2ik +
1
2
∑
k1,k2:k1<k2,k1,k2∈[1,bi−ai]
yik1yik2
=
(bi + ai)
2
4
+ xi − bi + ai
2
+
(bi − ai)
4
+
1
2
∑
k1,k2:k1<k2,k1,k2∈[1,bi−ai]
yik1yik2 .
By symmetry, for a given value of xi,
E[yik1yik2 ] =
2x2i − 2xi − (bi+ai)
2
2
+ bi + ai − (bi−ai)2
(bi − ai)(bi − ai − 1)
Taking the expected value over D,
ED′ [yik1yik2 ] =
2cii − 2ci − (bi+ai)22 + bi + ai − (bi−ai)2
(bi − ai)(bi − ai − 1)
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3.
xixj =
(
bi + ai
2
+
1
2
bi−ai∑
k1=1
yik1
)bj + aj
2
+
1
2
bj−aj∑
k2=1
yjk2

=
(bi + ai)(bj + ai)
4
+
(ai + bi)
4
bj−aj∑
k=1
yjk +
(aj + bj)
4
bi−ai∑
k=1
yik +
1
4
bi−ai∑
k1=1
bj−aj∑
k2=1
yik1yjk2
=
(bi + ai)(bj + ai)
4
+
(bi + ai)(2xj − aj − bj)
4
+
(bj + aj)(2xi − ai − bi)
4
+
1
4
bi−ai∑
k1=1
bj−aj∑
k2=1
yik1yjk2
=
(bi + ai)xj
2
+
(bj + aj)xi
2
− (bi + ai)(bj + ai)
4
+
1
4
bi−ai∑
k1=1
bj−aj∑
k2=1
yik1yjk2
By symmetry, for given values of xi, xj ,
E[yik1yjk2 ] =
4xixj − 2(bi + ai)xj − 2(bj + aj)xi + (bi + ai)(bj + ai)
(bi − ai)(bj − aj)
Taking the expected value over D,
ED′ [yik1yjk2 ] =
4cij − 2(bi + ai)cj − 2(bj + aj)ci + (bi + ai)(bj + ai)
(bi − ai)(bj − aj)
4.6 A perfect integrality gap instance with two LTFs
Putting together the ideas we have so far, we can find a perfect integrality gap instance which
consists of two different balanced LTFs
Theorem 4.19. There exist two balanced linear forms l1, l2 : {−1,+1}k and a perfect integrality
gap instance {fi}where each fi is on the same set of variables x1, . . . , xk and has the form sign(l1)
or sign(l2). In fact, we may take l1 and l2 to be perfectly balanced (see Definition 4.20).
Proof. By Lemma 4.1, there is a set of linear forms {la}, a set of possible solution vectors V , and
values {ci}, {cii}, {cij} such that
1. ∀v ∈ V, Prl∈{la}[sign(l(v)) > 0] = 12
2. For all a there exists a distribution Da such that
(a) Da is supported on the set {v : v ∈ V, la(v) > 0}
(b) ∀i, Ev∈Da [vi] = ci
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(c) ∀i, Ev∈Da [v2i ] = cii
(d) ∀i, j, Ev∈Da [vivj] = cij
In fact, we may take V and the values {ci}, {cii}, {cij} to be symmetric under permutations of the
input variables and have that all of the {la} are the same as some linear form l up to permuting the
input variables.
Using Lemma 4.9, we can construct sets of linear forms {l′a1} ∪ {l′a2}, a set of solution vectors
V ′, and values {c′i}, {c′ii}, {c′ij} such that
1. If v′ /∈ V ′ then l′a1(v′)l′a2(v′) < 0 for all a.
2. For all a, σ and all vb ∈ V there exists a vector v′bσ ∈ V ′ such that l′a1(v′bσ) = l′a2(v′bσ) =
la(vb).
3. For all a there exists a distribution D′a such that
(a) D′a is supported on the set {v′ : v′ ∈ V ′, l′a1(v′) > 0}
(b) ∀i, Ev′∈D′a [v′i] = c′i
(c) ∀i, Ev′∈D′a [v′2i ] = c′ii
(d) ∀i, j, Ev′∈D′a [v′iv′j] = c′ij
Moreover, we may take the linear forms {l′a1} ∪ {l′a2} so that all of the linear forms {l′a1} are the
same as some linear form l′1 up to permutations of the variables and all of the linear forms {l′a2}
are the same as some linear form l′2.
The first two conditions imply that for all v′, exactly half of {l′a1(v′)}∪{l′a2(v′)} are positive. To
see that we can take l′1 to have boolean variables and be perfectly balanced, we use the following
idea. Recall that we obtained the linear forms {l′a1(v′)} ∪ {l′a2(v′)} by first finding a single l′a1
and l′a2 and then permuting the original variables of the core (which correspond to the k indices
in Lemma 4.9) to obtain the linear forms l′a′1 and l
′
a′2 for all a
′ 6= a. We adjust this procedure to
first apply transformations to l′a1 and l
′
a2 and then permute the original variables of the core (which
correspond to the k indices in Lemma 4.9) as before to obtain the linear forms l′a′1 and l
′
a′2 for
all a′ 6= a. In particular, we use Lemma 4.18 to make l′a1 and l′a2 have boolean variables. We
then add dummy variables to make k be a power of 2 and use Lemma 4.25 to make l′a1 and l
′
a2
perfectly balanced. In this way, we can make the linear forms l′1 and l
′
2 have boolean variables and
be perfectly balanced, giving us a perfect integrality gap instance.
4.7 Finding a single balanced LTF which is unique games hard to approxi-
mate
We now describe how to use this perfect integrality gap instance with two different balanced LTFs
to find a perfect integrality gap instance with a single balanced LTF.
Definition 4.20. We say that a linear form l on k ±1 variables is perfectly balanced if
∀j ∈ [1, k − 1], P rx∈{x:∑i xi=2j−k}[l(x) > 0] = 12
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Example 4.21. The linear form l(x) = 2x1 + x2 − x3 − x4 is perfectly balanced.
Proposition 4.22. A linear form can only be perfectly balanced if k is a power of 2.
Lemma 4.23. If l1 =
∑k
i=1 wixi and l2 =
∑k
i=1 w
′
ixi are two perfectly balanced linear forms on k
variables then there exists a linear form l3 =
∑k
i=1
∑k
j=1wijxij on k
2 variables which is perfectly
balanced and has the following properties:
1. ∀i,∑kj=1wij = wi
2. ∀j,∑ki=1wij = w′j
3. If {xij} have values such that there exist i, j, j′ such that xij 6= xij′ then
Eσ∈Sk [sign(l3({xiσ(j))})] = 0
4. If {xij} have values such that there exist i, i′, j, such that xij 6= xi′j then
Eσ∈Sk [sign(l3({xσ(i)j)})] = 0
Proof. To obtain this linear form, we start by finding a linear form l which obeys the first two
statements which can be done by solving a system of linear equations. We will then add terms
of the form B(xij − xij′ − xi′j + xi′j′) to l. The idea is that this effectively adds the constraint
xij−xij′−xi′j +xi′j′ = 0. This constraint is satisfied for all i < i′, j < j′ if we are either constant
along rows or constant along columns. Otherwise, there will be such a constraint which is violated.
However, here we cannot take a set of constraints and their negations because this would give
two different LTFs while we are trying to only have one LTF. Instead, we must ensure that when a
constraint is violated and we average over the permutations, we get each sign with equal probabil-
ity. We can do this as follows. We take
l3 = l +
∑
y,a,b∈{0,1}log2(k):a·zy mod 2=0,b·zy mod 2=0
Byab(xab − xab′ − xa′b + xa′b′)
where zy is an aribtrary vector such that y · zy mod 2 = 1, a′ = a⊕ y, b′ = b⊕ y, and the Byab are
exponentially decreasing constants (which are still much larger than the weights {wi} and {w′i}).
If we are given values of {xij} which violate these constraints then let y′ be the first y such that
a constraint xab − xab′ − xa′b + xa′b′ where a′ = a ⊕ y and b′ = b ⊕ y is violated. Now take σ to
be the permutation σ(x) = x ⊕ y′. Observe that regardless of whether we apply σ to the rows or
the columns, we change the sign of all constraints xab − xab′ − xa′b + xa′b′ = 0 where a′ = a⊕ y′
and b′ = b⊕ y′. Moreover, for all y, we keep the set of constraints {xab − xab′ − xa′b + xa′b′ , a′ =
a⊕ y, b′ = b⊕ y} the same. Thus, for earlier y these constraints will still all be satisfied. For later
y, we will permute which constraints are satisfied but this does not matter because they all have
smaller coefficients. Thus, if any of these constraints are violated, both signs are equally likely
when we average over permutations of the rows or average over permutations of the columns.
Lemma 4.24. If {xij} satisfy the constraints then either ∀i, j, j′ ∈ [1, k], xij = xij′ or ∀i, i′, j ∈
[1, k], xij = xi′j
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Proof. Let A = {i : xii = −1} and let B = {i : xii = 1}. Observe that for all i, j we have the
constraint xii − xij − xji + xjj = 0. This implies that whenever i, j ∈ A, xij = −1 and whenever
i, j ∈ B, xij = 1.
If A = ∅ or B = ∅ the result is now trivial. Otherwise, choose an i ∈ A and a j ∈ B and
observe the following:
1. For all y such that i ⊕ y ∈ A, j ⊕ y ∈ A, xi(j⊕y) = x(i⊕y)(j⊕y) = −1 so x(i⊕y)j = xij .
Similarly, x(j⊕y)i = x(j⊕y)(i⊕y) = −1 so xj(i⊕y) = xji
2. For all y such that i⊕y ∈ B, j⊕y ∈ B, x(i⊕y)j = x(i⊕y)(j⊕y) = 1 so xi(j⊕y) = xij . Similarly,
xj(i⊕y) = x(j⊕y)(i⊕y) = 1 so x(j⊕y)i = xji
3. For all y such that i⊕y ∈ B, j⊕y ∈ A, xi(j⊕y) = −1 and x(i⊕y)j = 1 so x(i⊕y)(j⊕y) = −xij .
Similarly, x(j⊕y)i = −1 and xj(i⊕y) = 1 so x(j⊕y)(i⊕y) = −xji
4. For all y such that i⊕ y ∈ A, j ⊕ y ∈ B, x(i⊕y)(j⊕y) = xij and x(j⊕y)(i⊕y) = xji. To see this,
note that there are |B| y2 such that i⊕ y2 ∈ B and there are |A| y2 such that j ⊕ y2 ∈ A, so
there must be at least one y2 such that i⊕ y2 ∈ B, j ⊕ y2 ∈ A. Now observe that
x(i⊕y)(j⊕y) = −x(i⊕y⊕(y⊕y2))(j⊕y⊕(y⊕y2)) = −x(i⊕y2)(j⊕y2) = xij
Similarly,
x(j⊕y)(i⊕y) = −x(j⊕y⊕(y⊕y2))(i⊕y⊕(y⊕y2)) = −x(j⊕y2)(i⊕y2) = xji
There are now two cases to consider. Either xij = −1 or xij = 1. If xij = −1 then we expect to
be constant along rows and if xij = 1 then we expect to be constant along columns. We confirm
this as follows:
1. If xij = −1 then x(i⊕y)(j⊕y) = −1 whenever i⊕y ∈ A. To see this, note that if i⊕y ∈ A and
j⊕y ∈ A then x(i⊕y)(j⊕y) = −1 and if i⊕y ∈ A and j⊕y ∈ B then x(i⊕y)(j⊕y) = xij = −1.
This implies that xij = −1 whenever i ∈ A.
Given i ∈ A, j ∈ B, there exists a y such that i⊕ A ∈ B and j ⊕ y ∈ A and we have that
xji = −x(j⊕y)(i⊕y) = 1
This implies that xji = 1 whenever j ∈ B.
2. If xij = 1 then x(i⊕y)(j⊕y) = 1 whenever j ⊕ y ∈ B. To see this, note that if i⊕ y ∈ B and
j ⊕ y ∈ B then x(i⊕y)(j⊕y) = 1 and if i⊕ y ∈ A and j ⊕ y ∈ B then x(i⊕y)(j⊕y) = xij = 1.
This implies that xji = 1 whenever j ∈ B.
Given i ∈ A, j ∈ B, there exists a y such that i⊕ A ∈ B and j ⊕ y ∈ A and we have that
xji = −x(j⊕y)(i⊕y) = −1
This implies that xji = −1 whenever i ∈ A.
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Thus, if all of the constraints are satisfied then the {xij} are either constant along rows or
constant along columns. If the {xij} are constant along rows then letting xi be the value of xij ,
l3(x) =
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
wijxij =
k∑
i=1
(
k∑
j=1
wij
)
xi =
k∑
i=1
wixi = l1(x1, . . . , xk)
If the {xij} are constant along columns then letting xj be the value of xij ,
l3(x) =
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
wijxij =
k∑
j=1
(
k∑
i=1
wij
)
xj =
k∑
j=1
w′jxj = l2(x1, . . . , xk)
We now check that l3 is perfectly balanced. We can ignore the cases when the {xij} are not constant
along rows and not constant along columns because these cases average to 0 under permutations. If
the {xij} are constant along rows and are not all the same then it is as if we have the variables {xi}
for the linear form l1. Since l1 is perfectly balanced, if we permute the rows then we will obtain
both signs with equal probability. Similarly, if the {xij} are constant along columns and are not
all the same then it is as if we have the variables {xj} for the linear form l2. Since l2 is perfectly
balanced, if we permute the columns then we will obtain both signs with equal probability.
4.8 Making an LTF perfectly balanced
Lemma 4.25. Given a linear form l on k variables {x1, . . . , xk} taking values in {−1,+1} where
k is a power of 2, there is a linear form l′ on 2k variables {x1, . . . , xk}∪{y1, . . . , yk} taking values
in {−1,+1} such that
1. l′ is perfectly balanced.
2. If yi = −xi for all i ∈ [1, k] then l′(x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk) = l(x1, . . . , xk)
Proof. We take l′ to have two components. The larger component will be nonzero as long as
yi = xi for some i and will be 0 if yi = −xi for all i. This component will be chosen independently
of l. The second component will be l. Thus, l′ has value l(x1, . . . , xk) if yi = −xi for all i and
otherwise the sign of l′ does not depend on l.
Observe that whether or not l′ is perfectly balanced depends only on the first component. To
see this, note that the behavior of l only matters in the layer where we have k −1s and k 1s and we
always have that half of the inputs to l result in a positive sign and half of the inputs to l result in a
negative sign.
Taking the variables for the first component to be xi+yi
2
, these variables can have 3 values, −1,
0, or 1. We generalize the definition for being perfectly balanced as follows:
Definition 4.26. We say that a linear form l on V -valued variables (where V is some finite set of
values) is perfectly balanced if permuting the variables has equal probability to reslt in a positive
or negative sign unless the variables all have the same value.
Now we just need to find a construction of a single perfectly balanced l on 2j {−1, 0, 1}-valued
variables for all j ≥ 0. We can find such a construction inductively using the following lemma.
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Lemma 4.27. Given a perfectly balanced linear form l on 2j V -valued variables, we can find a
perfectly balanced linear form l′ on 2j+1 V -valued variables.
Proof. For each variable xi in l, take variables xi, yi for l′. We take
l′ = Blconstraint({yi − xi}) + l({xi})
where lconstraint is an arbitrary linear form on (V −V )-valued variables which is only 0 if all of its
inputs are 0 and we take B to be a sufficiently large coefficient so that l({xi}) is negligible unless
lconstraint({yi − xi}) = 0
Observe that swapping all of the xi with the yi changes the sign of lconstraint({yi − xi}) and
thus l′ unless xi = yi for all i. If xi = yi for all i then averaging over permutations of {xi} (and
applying the same permutation to {yi}) results in an equal probability of being positive or negative
unless all of the variables are equal.
4.9 Putting everything together
We now put everything together to prove our main result.
Theorem 4.28. There exists a balanced linear form l3 and a perfect integrality gap instance {fi}
such that each fi has the form sign(l3).
Corollary 4.29. There exists a balanced LTF which is unique games hard to approximate.
Proof. By Theorem 4.19, there exist two perfectly balanced linear forms l1, l2 : {−1,+1}k and a
perfect integrality gap instance {fi} where each fi is on the same set of variables x1, . . . , xk and
has the form sign(l1) or sign(l2).
By Lemma 4.23, if l1 =
∑k
i=1 wixi and l2 =
∑k
i=1w
′
ixi then there exists a linear form l3 =∑k
i=1
∑k
j=1wijxij on k
2 variables which is perfectly balanced and has the following properties:
1. ∀i,∑kj=1wij = wi
2. ∀j,∑ki=1wij = w′j
3. If {xij} have values such that there exist i, j, j′ such that xij 6= xij′ then
Eσ∈Sk [sign(l3({xiσ(j))})] = 0
4. If {xij} have values such that there exist i, i′, j, such that xij 6= xi′j then
Eσ∈Sk [sign(l3({xσ(i)j)})] = 0
Definition 4.30. We define X to be the matrix of variables Xij = xij
Definition 4.31. If Y is a matrix of variables Yij = yij then we define
l3(Y ) = l3(y11, y12, . . . , y1k, y21, . . . , yk(k−1)ykk)
25
We transform our perfect integrality gap instance into an integrality gap instance {f ′i} where each
f ′i is on the same set of variables x11, . . . , xkk and has the form sign(l3) as follows. We replace
each linear form l1(x1, . . . , xk) by {l3(XP ) : P is a permutation matrix} and replace each linear
form l2(x1, . . . , xk) by {l3(PX) : P is a permutation matrix}. To obtain our new distributions
{D′a}, we take the old distributions {Da} and take xij = xi for all i, j.
We now observe that
1. If xij = xi for all i, j then for all permutation matrices P , l3(XP ) = l1(x1, x2, . . . , xk)
and l3(PX) = l2(x1, . . . , xk). Thus, if xij = xi for all i, j then our transformed instance
behaves exactly like our original perfect integrality gap instance. This implies that our new
distributions {D′a} satisfy the required conditions.
2. If xij 6= xi for some i, j then exactly half of the linear forms l3(XP ) will be positive and
exactly half of the linear forms l3(PX) will be positive.
Putting these observations together, we have a perfect integrality gap instance {f ′i} where each f ′i
has the form sign(l3), as needed.
5 Approximation algorithms for predicates
In this section, we discuss the kinds of approximation algorithms/rounding schemes we must an-
alyze. We note that the ideas here are similar to the ideas of the paper “Proving Weak Approx-
imability without Algorithms” by Syed and Tulsiani [18]. Indeed, the functions {fa} which we
describe below play a central role in their analysis as well. That said, while Syed and Tulsiani use
these functions to show that predicates are approximable without actually finding an approxima-
tion algorithm, we use these functions to directly show that predicates are approximable by giving
an approximation algorithm.
To evaluate the performance of a rounding scheme, we consider the Fourier decomposition
C(x) =
∑
I⊆[1,n] CˆIxI of each constraint C where we take xI =
∏
i∈I xi. We will then consider
the expected value of each monomial xI after rounding. To do better than a random assignment, it is
sufficient to find a rounding algorithm together with a δ > 0 such that given any point p ∈ KTWC ,
after rounding we have that
E[C(x)] =
∑
I⊆[1,n]
CˆIE[xI ] > Ex∈{−1,+1}n [C(x)] + δ
We now consider what freedom we have in choosing the expected values of the monomials
{xI}. As discussed in the previous section, the standard SDP will provide biases bi = E[xi]
and bij = bji = E[xixj] for each variable and pair of variables. Using these biases, a rounding
algorithm R can probabilistically choose values in {−1,+1} for the variables {xi}. With these
choices, we have the following freedom for choosing the expected values of the monomials {xI}
Theorem 5.1. Given continuous functions fa : [−1, 1]a+(
a
2) → [−1, 1] for each a ∈ [1, k] such
that
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1. For all permutations σ ∈ Sa,
fa({biσ(j) : j ∈ [1, a]} ∪ {biσ(j1)iσ(j2) : j1, j2 ∈ [1, a], j1 < j2}) =
fa({bij : j ∈ [1, a]} ∪ {bij1 ij2 : j1, j2 ∈ [1, a], j1 < j2})
2. For all signs {sij : j ∈ [1, a]} ∈ {−1, 1}a,
fa({sijbij : j ∈ [1, a]} ∪ {sij1sij2 bij1 ij2 : j1, j2 ∈ [1, a], j1 < j2}) =(
a∏
j=1
sij
)
fa({bij : j ∈ [1, a]} ∪ {bij1 ij2 : j1, j2 ∈ [1, a], j1 < j2})
there exists a sequence of rounding schemes {Rq} and real coefficients {cq} such that for all subsets
I of size at most k,∑
q
cqERq [vI ] = f|I|({bij : j ∈ [1, k]} ∪ {bij1 ij2 : j1, j2 ∈ [1, k], j1 < j2})
Moreover, we can take this sum to be globally convergent.
Example 5.2. We can take f1 to be any odd continuous function on one variable.
Example 5.3. We can take f2 to be any continuous function such that
∀bi, bj, bij, f2(bi, bj, bij) = −f2(−bi, bj,−bij) = f2(bj, bi, bij)
Example 5.4. We can take f3 to be any contiuous function such that ∀bi, bj, bk, bij, bik, bjk,
1. f3(bi, bj, bk, bij, bik, bjk) = f3(bj, bi, bk, bij, bjk, bik) = f3(bk, bj, bi, bjk, bik, bij)
2. f3(bi, bj, bk, bij, bik, bjk) = f3(−bi, bj, bk,−bij,−bik, bjk)
Proof sketch of Theorem 5.1. Since the KTW polytope is compact, any continuous function on the
KTW polytope can be approximated by a polynomial. Thus, it is sufficient to show how we can
approximately obtain monomials.
Lemma 5.5. Let p({bi : i ∈ [1,m]}, {bij : i < j, i, j ∈ [1,m]}) be a monomial. For sufficiently
small α > 0, given a partition (V1, . . . , Vm) of the indices [1, n], there is a linear combination of
rounding schemes R such that
1. Given (i1, . . . , im) such that ij ∈ Vj ,
ER
[
m∏
j=1
xij
]
= αdeg(p)p({bij : j ∈ [1,m]}, {bij1 ij2 : j1 < j2 : j1, j2 ∈ [1,m]})±O(αdeg(p)+1)
2. Given a subset of indices I ⊆ [1, n] such that I does not contain exactly one index from each
Vj ,
∣∣∑
i ciERi [
∏
i∈I xi]
∣∣ is O(αdeg(p)+1)
Proof.
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Definition 5.6. We define χB,α,V to be the operator which does the following:
1. For all i ∈ V , the operator multiplies xi by 1 with probability 1+αbi2 and multiplies xi by −1
with probability 1+αbi
2
2. For all i /∈ V , the operator keeps xi as is.
Lemma 5.7. For any linear combination R of rounding schemes and I ⊆ [1, n],
1. If I ∩ V = ∅ then EχB,α,V R[xI ] = ER[xI ]
2. If I ∩ V = {i} then EχB,α,V R[xI ] = αbiER[xI ]±O(α2)
3. If |I ∩ V | ≥ 2 then ∣∣EχB,α,V R[xI ]∣∣ is O(α2 |ER[xI ]|)
Definition 5.8. We define χB,α,V,V ′ to be the operator which does the following:
1. Finds vectors {u0, u1, . . . , un} ∈ Rn such that (αB + (1− α)Id)ij = ui · uj .
2. Chooses a random unit vector w ∈ Rn
3. For all i ∈ [1, n], multiplies xi by sign(w · ui) if i ∈ V ∪ V ′ and keeps xi as is if i /∈ V ∪ V ′
Remark 5.9. Although this operator really acts on the single subset V ∪ V ′, we write both V and
V ′ because we are focusing on the case where I has one index in V and one index in V ′.
Lemma 5.10. For any linear combination R of rounding schemes and I ⊆ [1, n],
1. If I ∩ (V ∪ V ′) = ∅ then EχB,α,V,V ′R[xI ] = ER[xI ]
2. If I ∩ (V ∪ V ′) = {i} then EχB,α,V,V ′R[xI ] = 0
3. If I ∩ (V ∪ V ′) = {i, j} then EχB,α,V,V ′R[xI ] = 2piαbijER[xI ]±O(α2)
4. If |I ∩ (V ∪ V ′)| ≥ 3 then
∣∣∣EχB,α,V,V ′R[xI ]∣∣∣ is O(α2 |ER[xI ]|)
Proof. The first and second parts are trivial. For the third part, the angle between ui and uj will be
≈ pi
2
− αbij so the probability that sign((w · ui)(w · uj)) = −1 is ≈
pi
2
−αbij
pi
so E[sign((w · ui)(w ·
uj))] ≈ 2piαbij . For the fourth part, since all of the vectors {ui} are nearly orthogonal to each other,
for any subset I of size at least 3,
∣∣E [sign (∏i∈I (w · ui))]∣∣ is O(α2)
Definition 5.11. Given distinct subsets of vertices (V1, . . . , Vj), define PV1,...,Vj to be the operator
which does the following:
1. Select each (y1, . . . , yj) ∈ {−1,+1}d with weight 2−j
∏j
i=1 yi.
2. For each xi, if i ∈ Va for some a ∈ [1, j] then multiply xi by ya. Otherwise leave xi as is.
Proposition 5.12. For any linear combination R of rounding schemes and I ⊆ [1, n], if I has an
odd number of elements in each of the subsets V1, . . . , Vj then EPV1,...,VjR[xI ] = ER[xI ]. Otherwise,
EPV1,...,VjR[xI ] = 0.
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To obtain our final linear combination Rfinal of rounding schemes, we start with the trivial
rounding scheme which sets each xi to 1 and then apply the following operators
1. For each term bi in p, we apply the operator χB,α,Vi
2. For each term bij in p, we apply the operator χB,α,Vi,Vj
3. We apply the operator P(V1, . . . , Vm)
Now consider Rfinal[xI ]. Because of the operator P (V1, . . . , Vm), Rfinal[xI ] = 0 unless I contains
an odd number of elements in each of the subsets V1, . . . , Vm. From the above lemmas, the domi-
nant terms will be the ones where I contains exactly one element in each of the subsets V1, . . . , Vm,
which gives a constant times the desired monomial.
Remark 5.13. This theorem is essentially the dual of the KTW criterion.
Remark 5.14. If our predicate is odd, whenever we have a negative coefficient we can instead flip
all of the signs of variables. Thus, any odd predicates (including balanced LTFs) which can be
weakly approximated can also be approximated.
6 A simpler approximation algorithm for monarchy
In this section, we give an approximation algorithm for monarchy which is simpler than the original
approximation algorithm shown by Austrin, Benabbas, and Magen [1]. We note that the ideas
here are similar to the ideas used by Syed and Tulsiani [18] to give a proof that monarchy is
approximable without giving an approximation algorithm.
Definition 6.1. The monarchy predicate on k variables x1, . . . , xk is
f(x) = sign
(
(k − 2)x1 +
k∑
i=2
xi
)
We call x1 the president and x2, . . . , xk citizens
Definition 6.2. We denote the Fourier coefficient of a set of a citizens by fˆaC and we denote the
Fourier coefficient of the president together with a citizens by fˆP+aC
Theorem 6.3. The following rounding scheme does better than 1
2
for the monarchy predicate with
k variables.
1. If xi has bias bi, after rounding xi will have bias bi
2. If xi1 , xi2 , xi3 have biases bi1 , bi2 , bi3 then after rounding xi1xi2xi3 will have bias
Csign(bi1bi2bi3) min{|bi1|, |bi2 |, |bi3|}
where we take C = fˆP−(k−2)fˆC
fˆ3C(k−13 )−fˆP+2C(k−12 )
29
Proof. Our predicate is l = (k − 2)x1 +
∑k
i=2 xi. Let α = b1 and let β =
∑k
i=2 bi.
We have that (k − 2)α + β ≥ 1, but the contribution from the degree 1 terms is

(
fˆPα + fˆCβ
)
where fˆC is exponentially smaller than fˆP . We compensate for this using the degree 3 terms.
Lemma 6.4.
1.
∑
i1,i2,i3∈[2,k]:i1<i2<i3 sign(bi1bi2bi3) min{|bi1|, |bi2|, |bi3 |} ≥ −
(
k−1
3
)
α
2.
∑
i1,i2∈[2,k]:i1<i2 sign(b1bi1bi2) min{|b1|, |bi1|, |bi2|} ≤
(
k−1
2
)
α
Proof.
Proposition 6.5. ∀i ∈ [2, k], bi ≥ −α
Proof. Observe that the only satisfying assignment which has x1 = −1 is x1 = −1, xi = 1 for all
i ∈ [2, k]. Thus, for all i ∈ [2, k] we always have that xi ≥ −x1 and the result follows.
With this proposition in mind, we have two cases. Either α ≤ 0 or α > 0. If α ≤ 0 then
1. For all i1, i2, i3 ∈ [2, k], min{|bi1 |, |bi2|, |bi3|} ≥ −α so∑
i1,i2,i3∈[2,k]:i1<i2<i3
sign(bi1bi2bi3) min{|bi1|, |bi2|, |bi3|} ≥ −
(
k − 1
3
)
α
2. For all i1, i2 ∈ [2, k], min{|b1|, |bi1|, |bi2|} = −α so∑
i1,i2∈[2,k]:i1<i2
sign(b1bi1bi2) min{|b1|, |bi1|, |bi2 |} =
(
k − 1
2
)
α
Similarly, if α > 0 then
1. For all i1, i2, i3 ∈ [2, k], if bi1bi2bi3 < 0 then min{|bi1|, |bi2|, |bi3|} ≤ α so∑
i1,i2,i3∈[2,k]:i1<i2<i3
sign(bi1bi2bi3) min{|bi1|, |bi2|, |bi3|} ≥ −
(
k − 1
3
)
α
2. For all i1, i2 ∈ [2, k], min{|b1|, |bi1|, |bi2|} ≤ α so∑
i1,i2∈[2,k]:i1<i2
sign(b1bi1bi2) min{|b1|, bi1 , bi2|} ≤
(
k − 1
2
)
α
Thus, since fˆ3C > 0 and fˆP+2C < 0, the contribution from the degree 3 terms is at least
C
(
fˆP+2C
(
k − 1
2
)
− fˆ3C
(
k − 1
3
))
α ≥ ((k − 2)fˆC − fˆP )α
Adding the contributions together, we obtain

(
fˆPα + fˆCβ
)
+ ((k − 2)fˆC − fˆP )α = ((k − 2)α + β)fˆC ≥ fˆC > 0
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7 Approximation algorithm for almost monarchy
In this section, we show that the almost monarchy predicate is approximable for sufficiently large
k.
Definition 7.1. The almost monarchy predicate on k variables x1, . . . , xk is
f(x) = sign
(
(k − 4)x1 +
k∑
i=2
xi
)
We call x1 the president and x2, . . . , xk citizens
Remark 7.2. For the almost monarchy predicate, the president gets his/her way as long as he/she
has at least two supporters among the citizens.
Definition 7.3. We take α = b1 and we take β =
∑k
i=2 bi
Theorem 7.4. For sufficiently large k, the almost monarchy predicate on k variables is approx-
imable.
To prove this theorem, we use the following rounding scheme.
1. After rounding, xi will have bias bi
2. After rounding, xi1xi2xi3 will have bias
3
C
E
(bi1bi2i3 + bi2bi1i3 + bi3bi1i2)
3. After rounding, xi1xi2xi3xi4xi5 will have bias
−6C
E2
(bi1bi2i3bi4i5 + symmetric terms)
4. After rounding, xi1xi2xi3xi4xi5xi6xi7 will have bias
6
C
E3
(bi1bi2i3bi4i5bi6i7 + symmetric terms)
where we take E = k
2−9k+18
2
and we take
C =
2k−2
(
fˆP − (k − 4)fˆC
)
(k − 2)(k − 3)
We now give a sketch for why this rounding scheme does better than random (when the SDP thinks
almost all constraints are satisfiable). We will then give a full proof.
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Proof sketch. Consider the expression
S{(i1,i2)} =
∑
i1,i2∈[2,k]:i1<i2
bi1i2
Roughly speaking, the least favorable accepting assignments are the ones where the monarch votes
YES and all but two of the citizens vote NO or the monarch votes NO and all but one of the citizens
vote YES. In these cases, S{(i1,i2)} ≈ E. In these cases, writing S{(i1,i2)} = E(1 + ∆), we expect
∆ to be small.
Now observe that we have the following approximations
1.
∑
i1<i2<i3∈[2,k] (bi1bi2i3 + bi2bi1i3 + bi3bi1i2) ≈ βS{(i1,i2)} = βE(1 + ∆)
2. 2
∑
i1<i2<i3∈[2,k] (bi1bi2i3bi4i5 + symmetric terms) ≈ β(S{(i1,i2)})2 = βE2(1 + ∆)2
3. 6
∑
i1<i2<i3∈[2,k] (bi1bi2i3bi4i5bi6i7 + symmetric terms) ≈ β(S{(i1,i2)})3 = βE3(1 + ∆)3
When |∆| is small, all of these expressions are close to a multiple of β and could potentially be
used to counteract the excess α from the degree 1 terms. However, by taking a linear combination
of these expressions, we can obtain an even better approximation to β. Observe that
3(1 + ∆)− 3(1 + ∆)2 + (1 + ∆)3 = ((1 + ∆)− 1)3 + 1 = ∆3 + 1
Thus, the contribution from the degree 3,5, and 7 terms is approximately C(1 + ∆3)β. When |∆|
is small, this is close enough to Cβ to counteract the extra α in the degree 1 terms, giving us a
positive value. When |∆| is large, the degree 1 terms are very favorable for us which gives us a
positive value.
Full proof. Before giving the full proof, we need some preliminaries.
We need the following Fourier coefficients
Lemma 7.5.
1. For all odd a, fˆaC = k−2a2k−2
2. Whenever a is even and a ≥ 2, fˆP+aC = 2a−k2k−2
For a proof, see Appendix C
Corollary 7.6. We have the following Fourier coefficients:
1. fˆC = k−22k−2
2. fˆ3C = k−62k−2
3. fˆ5C = k−102k−2
4. fˆ7C = k−142k−2
5. fˆP = 1− k2k−2
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6. fˆP+2C = 4−k2k−2
7. fˆP+4C = 8−k2k−2
8. fˆP+6C = 12−k2k−2
We use the following notation for sums of products of biases.
Definition 7.7. Given a set of indices E1 and a set of edges E2, define
BE1∪E2 =
∏
i∈E1
bi ·
∏
(i,j)∈E2
bij
Definition 7.8. Given a hypergraph H such that the vertices of H are labeled with either α or an
unspecified index ij and the edges of H have arity 1 or 2, we define
SH =
∑
E1,E2:∃σ:V (H)→[1,k]:σ is injective ,
σ(α)=1,σ(E(H))=E1∪E2
BE1∪E2
We write down each such H by writing down the edges in each connected component of H within
{} brackets.
We now have the following approximate equalities, all of which can be proved with inclu-
sion/exclusion. For the exact equalities and images corresponding to the calculations, see the
appendix.
Lemma 7.9.
1. S{i1},{(i2,i3)} = βS{(i1,i2)} − S{i1,(i1,i2)}
2. S{α},{(i2,i3)} = αS{(i1,i2)}
3. S{i1},{α,i2} = βS{α,i1} ±O(k)
4. 2S{i1},{(i2,i3)},{(i4,i5)} = β(S{(i1,i2)})
2 − 2S{i1,(i1,i2)}S{(i1,i2)} − 2βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3)} ±O(k3)
5. 2S{α},{(i2,i3)},{(i4,i5)} = α(S{(i1,i2)})
2 ±O(k3)
6. S{i1},{(α,i2)},{(i3,i4)} = βS{(α,i1)}S{(i1,i2)} ±O(k3)
7. 6S{i1},{(i2,i3)},{(i4,i5)},{i6,i7} = β(S{(i1,i2)})
3−3S{i1,(i1,i2)}(S{(i1,i2)})2−6βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3)}S{(i1,i2)}±
O(k5)
8. 6S{α},{(i2,i3)},{(i4,i5)},{i6,i7} = α(S{(i1,i2)})
3 ±O(k5)
9. 2S{i1},{(α,i2)},{(i3,i4)},{i5,i6} = βS{(α,i1)}(S{(i1,i2)})
2 ±O(k5)
Definition 7.10. We write S{i1,i2} = E(1 + ∆)
For our approximation algorithm, we obtain the following contributions for the degree 3, 5, and
7 terms divided by C22−k (ignoring terms of size O(1)):
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1. (k − 6) (3β(1 + ∆)− 3
E
S{i1,(i1,i2)}
)
2. −3(k − 4)α(1 + ∆)
3. −3(k − 4)βS{α,i1}
4. (k − 10) (−3β(1 + ∆)2 + 6
E
(1 + ∆)S{i1,(i1,i2)}
)
5. −3(k − 8)α(1 + ∆)2
6. −6(k−8)
E
β(1 + ∆)S{(α,i1)}
7. (k − 14) (β(1 + ∆)3 − 3
E
(1 + ∆)2S{i1,(i1,i2)}
)
8. −α(k − 12)(1 + ∆)3
9. −β(k − 12) 3
E
(1 + ∆)2S{(α,i1)}
Adding up these terms, we obtain
(k − 2) (3(1 + ∆)− 3(1 + ∆)2 + (1 + ∆)3) β
− 4 (3(1 + ∆)− 6(1 + ∆)2 + 3(1 + ∆)3) β
+ (k − 6) 3
E
(
1− 2(1 + ∆) + (1 + ∆)2)S{i1,(i1,i2)}
− 4 3
E
(−2(1 + ∆) + 2(1 + ∆)2)S{i1,(i1,i2)}
− k (3(1 + ∆)− 3(1 + ∆)2 + (1 + ∆)3)α
+ 4
(
3(1 + ∆)− 6(1 + ∆)2 + 3(1 + ∆)3)α
− (k − 4) 1
E
(
1− 2(1 + ∆) + (1 + ∆)2) βS{(α,i1)}
+ 4
1
E
(−2(1 + ∆) + 2(1 + ∆)2) βS{(α,i1)}
= (k − 2)β + (k − 2)∆3β − 4(3∆2 + 3∆3)β
− kα− k∆3α + 4(3∆2 + 3∆3)α
+
3(k − 6)
E
∆2S{i1,(i1,i2)} −
12
E
(2∆ + 2∆2)S{i1,(i1,i2)}
− (k − 4)
E
∆2βS{(α,i1)} +
4
E
(2∆ + 2∆2)βS{(α,i1)}
Ignoring negligible terms, this is
(k − 2)(1 + ∆3)(β − α)− 4(3∆2 + 3∆3)β + 3k
E
∆2S{i1,(i1,i2)} −
k
E
∆2βS{α,i1}
We focus on the term (k − 2)(1 + ∆3)(β − α) as this term has magnitude O(k2) while the other
terms have magnitude O(k)
Lemma 7.11. For sufficiently large k, we always have that (k − 4)α + β ≥ 1
3
+ (k−6)|∆|
3
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Proof. To prove this statement, it is sufficient to check that this statement holds for each individual
satisfying assignment as α and β are linear functions and |∆| is convex.
If x1 = −1 then there are either 0 or 1 −1s in {x2, . . . , xk}. If there is exactly one −1 in
{x2, . . . , xk} then (k− 4)x1 +
∑k
i=1 xi = 1 and
∑
i,j∈[2,k]:i<j xixj =
(
k−2
2
)− (k− 2) = (k−2)(k−5)
2
.
If there are no−1s in {x2, . . . , xk} then (k−4)x1 +
∑k
i=1 xi = 3 and
∑
i,j∈[2,k]:i<j xixj =
(
k−1
2
)
=
(k−1)(k−2)
2
.
If x1 = 1 then there can be at most (k− 3) −1s in {x2, . . . , xk}. If there is exactly (k− 3) −1s
in {x2, . . . , xk} then (k − 4)x1 +
∑k
i=1 xi = 1 and∑
i,j∈[2,k]:i<j
xixj =
(
k − 3
2
)
− 2(k − 3) + 1 = (k − 3)(k − 4)− 4(k − 3) + 2
2
=
k2 − 11k + 26
2
Since E = k
2−9k+18
2
, observe that the deviation of
∑
i,j∈[2,k]:i<j xixj from E is at most
3
2
(k − 4)
times (k−4)x1 +
∑k
i=1 xi− 13 . Thus, |∆|E ≤ 32(k−4)
(
(k − 4)x1 +
∑k
i=1 xi − 13
)
which implies
that
(k − 4)x1 +
k∑
i=1
xi ≥ 1
3
+
2|∆|E
3(k − 4) ≥
1
3
+
(k − 6)|∆|
3
We now consider what happens when we add (k − 2)(k − 3)α to the contribution from the
degree 3,5, and 7 terms, which ignoring negligible terms was
(k − 2)(1 + ∆3)(β − α)− 4(3∆2 + 3∆3)β + 3k
E
∆2S{i1,(i1,i2)} −
k
E
∆2βS{α,i1}
We have the following cases
1. If ∆ > −.55 then ∆2 < .3025 < 1
3
− 3
100
so for sufficiently large k,
(k − 2)(k − 3)α + (k − 2)(1 + ∆3)(β − α) = (k − 2)((k − 4)α + β) + (k − 2)∆3(β − α)
≥ (k − 2)
3
+
(k − 2)(k − 6)|∆|
3
+ (k − 2)∆3(β − α)
≥ (k − 2)
3
+
3(k − 2)(k − 6)|∆|
100
For sufficiently large k we have that
3(k − 2)(k − 6)|∆|
100
>
∣∣∣∣−4(3∆2 + 3∆3)β + 3kE ∆2S{i1,(i1,i2)} − kE∆2βS{α,i1}
∣∣∣∣
so the remaining terms are dominated and we are guaranteed to have a positive value.
2. If ∆ ≤ −.55 and k is sufficiently large then we must have α > 0. If so, we can instead
express the largest terms as a positive linear combination of (1 + ∆3)((k − 4)α+ β) and α.
In particular,
(k−2)(k−3)α+(k−2)(1+∆3)(β−α) = (k−2)(1+∆3)((k−4)α+β)−(k−2)(k−3)∆3α
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If ∆ ≥ −1 then both of these terms will be non-negative and at least one term will be Ω(k2).
The minimum possible value of ∆ is−1−O( 1
k
) so if ∆ < −1 then the second term is Ω(k2)
and it dominates the first term. Either way, for sufficiently large k, these terms will dominate
the remaining terms and we are again guaranteed to have a positive value.
8 Further Work
There are several possible questions for further research. A few of these questions are as follows
1. Our work gives renewed impetus to the following question: Can we prove sum of squares
lower bounds for approximating any CSP which is unique games hard to approximate? Prior
to our work, thanks to the sum of squares bounds of Kothari, Mori, O’Donnell, and Witmer
[12] on random CSPs, we did not have an example of a predicate P which is unique games
hard to approximate for which sum of squares lower bounds were unknown. With this work,
we now have such a predicate P .
2. Can we find a higher degree core, i.e. a core where we in addition to specifying the ex-
pected values ci, cii, cij of xi, x2i , xij we also specify the expected values of higher degree
monomials?
Remark 8.1. The kind of question this would answer is as follows. What degree Fourier
coefficients do we need to look at in order to distinguish between the case when all of our
balanced LTFs are satisfiable and at most half of our balanced LTFs are satisfiable?
3. Can we generalize the techniques we used to find an approximation algorithm for almost
monarchy to find approximation algorithms for other balanced LTFs. In particular, can we
prove that any presidential type predicate (i.e. a predicate of the form f(x1, . . . , xk) =
sign(c(k)x1 +
∑k
i=2 xi)) is approximable?
4. Are there any predicates P which are unique games hard to approximate but can be weakly
approximated?
5. Are there any predicates P which are unique games hard to weakly approximate such that
either any measure Λ certifying the KTW criterion for P must have more than one point.
Similarly, are there any predicates P which are unique games hard to approximate for which
there are no perfect integrality gap instances?
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A Verifying the KTW Criterion with a Perfect Integrality Gap
Instance
In this section, we verify that if we have a perfect integrality gap instance then the KTW criterion
is satisfied.
Lemma A.1. If there is a perfect integrality gap instance {fa : a ∈ [1,m]} of functions of form P
then P satisfies the KTW criterion for being unique games hard to weakly approximate.
Proof. To see that the KTW criterion for being unique games hard to weakly approximate is satis-
fied, if fa = P (za1xφa(1), . . . , zakxφa(k)) then take
pa := {zaibφa(i) : i ∈ [1, k]} concatenated with {zaizajbφa(i)φa(j) : i, j ∈ [1, k], i < j}
where the pairs i, j are in lexicographical order. Now take Λ to be
Λ =
m∑
a=1
1
m
δpa
where δp is the measure with weight one on the point p and weight 0 elsewhere. For each
subset S = {s1, . . . , st} ⊆ [1, k] of size t, each permutation pi : [1, t] → [1, t], and signs
z′ = (z′1, . . . , z
′
t) ∈ {−1,+1}t, define τS : [1, t] → [1, k] to be the map where τS(i) = si and
define
pa,S,pi,z′ := {z′izaτS(i)bφa(τS(pi(i))) : i ∈ [1, t]} concatenated with
{z′iz′jzaτS(i)zaτS(j)bφa(τS(pi(i)))φa(τS(pi(j))) : i, j ∈ [1, t], i < j}
We have that
Λ
(t)
P = ES⊆[1,k]:|S|=tEpi:[1,t]→[1,t]Ez′=(z′1,...,z′t)∈{−1,1}t
[(
t∏
i=1
z′i
)
· PˆS · ΛS,pi,z′
]
=
1
m
m∑
a=1
ES:|S|=tEpi:[1,t]→[1,t]Ez′=(z′1,...,z′t)∈{−1,1}t
[(
t∏
i=1
z′i
)
·
(∏
j∈S
zaj
)
· ˆ(fa)φa(S) · δpa,S,pi,z′
]
To show that this is 0, it is sufficient to show that for all subsets T ⊆ [1, n] of size t,
∑
a∈[1,m],S⊆[1,k]:φa(S)=T
Epi:[1,t]→[1,t]Ez′=(z′1,...,z′t)∈{−1,1}t
[(
t∏
i=1
z′i
)
·
(∏
j∈S
zaj
)
· ˆ(fa)T · δpa,S,pi,z′
]
= 0
To see that this expression is zero, take z′i = (wa,S)izaτS(i), take τT : [1, t] → T to be the map
such that τT (i) = ti, and for each permutation pi′ : T → T and w ∈ {−1,+1}t, define
pT,pi′,w := {wibpi′(τT (i)) : i ∈ [1, t]} concatenated with {wiwjbpi′(τT (i))pi′(τT (j)) : i, j ∈ [1, t], i < j}
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With these definitions, our expression is equal to
∑
a∈[1,m],S⊆[1,k]:φa(S)=T
Epi′:[1,t]→[1,t]Ewa,S∈{−1,1}t
[(
t∏
i=1
(wa,S)i
)
· ˆ(fa)T · δpT,pi′,wa,S
]
=
 ∑
a∈[1,m],S⊆[1,k]:φa(S)=T
ˆ(fa)T
Epi′:[1,t]→[1,t]Ew∈{−1,1}t [( t∏
i=1
wi
)
· δpT,pi′,w
]
=
̂( m∑
a=1
fa
)
T
Epi′:[1,t]→[1,t]Ew∈{−1,1}t
[(
t∏
i=1
wi
)
· δpT,pi′,w
]
which is 0 because |T | = t ≥ 1 and∑ma=1 fa is a constant function.
B Finding the core
In this section, we describe how we found the core given in subsection 4.2.
Some intuition is as follows. By changing coordinates, we can assume that the coefficients {ci}
and {cij} are all 0 and all of the {cij} are equal to each other. We can further assume that one of
the linear forms is approximately x1 + z for some constrant z. We want a set of possible solution
vectors such that
1. Exactly half of the possible solution vectors are on either side of the hyperplane x1 = −z
2. There is a distribution D1 such that
(a) D1 supported on vectors x in our set of possible solution vectors such that x1 > −z
(b) ED1 [xi] = 0, ED1 [xixj] = 0, and ED1 [x
2
i ] = cii
In oder to satisfy the first condition, we want z to be positive but as small as possible. However,
to satisfy the second condition we need x1 to have high variance and mean zero in the distribution
D1. In order for x1 to have high variance, mean zero, and a minimum value which is not much
less than 0, we take the distribution D1 so that x1 is almost always equal to its minimum value
but is very large with small probability. This suggests that we take solution vectors of the form
(−a,−a,−b,−b) and (e, 0, 0, 0) where e >> b > z > a. However, if we do this then the other
coordinates of x will not have a high enough variance.
We can fix this by also taking solution vectors of the form (−a,−c,−c, d) where d is large but
not as large as e. Thus, it is reasonable to try searching for cores of the following form:
1. Our vectors are permutations of one of the following vectors
(a) (−a,−a,−b,−b)
(b) (−a,−c,−c, d)
(c) (e, 0, 0, 0)
2. Our coefficients are
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(a) ∀i ∈ [1, 4], ci = 0
(b) ∀i < j ∈ [1, 4], cii = cjj
(c) ∀i < j ∈ [1, 4], cij = 0
3. The distribution D1 has the form
(a) Take each of the vectors (−a,−a,−b,−b), (−a,−b,−a,−b), and (−a,−a,−b,−b)
with probability p1.
(b) Take each of the vectors (−a,−c,−c, d), (−a,−c,−c, d), and (−a,−c,−c, d) with
probability p2.
(c) Take the vector (e, 0, 0, 0) with probability p3.
and the other distributions are symmetric to D1
In order to match the coefficients {ci}, {cii}, {cij} with such a core, we must satisfy the following
equations
1. E[x1] = −3ap1 − 3ap2 + ep3 = 0
2. E[x2] = −(2b+ a)p1 + (d− 2c)p2 = 0
3. E[x1x2] = a(2b+ a)p1 − a(d− 2c)p2 = 0
4. E[x2x3] = (b2 + 2ab)p1 + (c2 − 2cd)p2 = 0
5. E[x21] = 3a
2p1 + 3a
2p2 + e
2p3 = E[x
2
2] = (2b
2 + a2)p1 + (2c
2 + d2)p2
6. 3p1 + 3p2 + p3 = 1
Note that the third equation is −a times the second equation so it is redundant. Rearranging the
second equation and fourth equations gives
p2
p1
=
2b+ a
d− 2c =
b(b+ 2a)
c(2d− c)
As long as we satisfy the equation 2b+a
d−2c =
b(b+2a)
c(2d−c) , we will have enough degrees of freedom with
p1, p2, p3, e to satisfy the remaining equations.
Intuitively, −a should be just barely negative, so let’s try a = 1. −c should be more negative
than −a, but not by much, so let’s try c = 2. With these values, we have that 2b+1
d−4 =
b2+2b
4d−4 .
Rearranging, this implies that (b2 + 2b)(d− 4) = (2b+ 1)(4d− 4). Rearranging this equation we
obtain that
(b2 − 6b− 4)d = 4b2 − 4
We want that d − 2c > 0 and b > 1, so let’s try b = 7. This gives 3d = 192 so d = 64. Thus we
have that a = 1, b = 7, c = 2, and d = 64.
We now make the following deductions to find e, p1, p2, p3:
1. Looking at the second equation, 15p1 = 60p2 so p1 = 4p2
40
2. Looking at the first equation, ep3 = 3(p1 + p2) = 15p2
3. Looking at the fifth equation, 3(p1 + p2) + e2p3 = 15p2 + 15p2e = 99p1 + 4104p2 = 4500p2
so e = 4500−15
15
= 299
4. Plugging this into the first equation we obtain that p3 = 15299p2
5. Using the final equation 3p1 + 3p2 + p3 = 1 we obtain that
15 +
15
299
p2 =
4500
299
p2 = 1
so p2 = 2994500 , p1 =
1196
4500
, and p3 = 154500 =
1
300
C Fourier coefficient calculations
In this section, we compute the Fourier coefficients of the almost monarchy predicate
f(x1, . . . , xk) = sign((k − 4)x1 +
k∑
i=2
xi)
Lemma C.1. For all odd a, fˆaC = k−2a2k−2
Proof. We first choose what happens with the president and the other k − a− 1 citizens and then
consider the resulting function on a citizens. The probabilities are as follows:
1. With probability 2a−k, the president votes no but all the remaining citizens vote yes. If so,
f is 1 if and only if there is at most 1 no in the a citizens. The Fourier coefficient of this
function on a bits is (1− a)21−a so the resulting contribution is (1− a)21−k.
2. With probability 2a−k, the president votes yes but all the remaining citizens vote no. If so,
f is −1 if and only if there is at most 1 yes in the a citizens. The Fourier coefficient of this
function on a bits is (1− a)21−a so the resulting contribution is (1− a)21−k
3. With probability (k− a− 1)2a−k, the president and one citizen vote no but all the remaining
citizens vote yes. If so, f is 1 if and only if all of the a citizens vote yes. The Fourier
coefficient of this function on a bits is 21−a so the resulting contribution is (k − a− 1)21−k
4. With probability (k−a−1)2a−k, the president and one citizen vote yes but all the remaining
citizens vote no. If so, f is −1 if and only if all of the a citizens vote no. The Fourier
coefficient of this function on a bits is 21−a so the resulting contribution is (k − a− 1)21−k
5. In all other cases, the vote of these a citizens does not matter.
Summing these contributions up, we obtain k−2a
2k−2 , as needed.
Lemma C.2. Whenever a is even and a ≥ 2, fˆP+aC = 2a−k2k−2
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Proof. To analyze this, consider the president and one citizen. There are several possibilities for
what influence they can have:
1. The president gets his/her way. In this case, the contribution to the Fourier coefficient is 0
2. Their votes don’t matter because everyone else is unanimous. In this case, the contribution
to the Fourier coefficient is also 0.
3. f will be 1 if and only if at least one of the president and the citizen say yes. In this case, the
contribution to the Fourier coefficient is −1
2
4. f will only be 1 if both the president and the citizen say yes. In this case, the contribution to
the Fourier coefficient is 1
2
.
With this in mind, we have the following probabilities:
1. With probability (a−1)2a+1−k21−a, all the outside citizens vote yes and a−2 of the remain-
ing a − 1 citizens vote yes. If so, f is 1 if and only if at least one of the president and the
citizen say yes. The resulting contribution is (a− 1)21−k.
2. With probability (a−1)2a+1−k21−a, all the outside citizens vote no and a−2 of the remaining
a− 1 citizens vote no. If so, f is 1 if and only if at both the president and the citizen say yes.
The resulting contribution is (a− 1)21−k.
3. With probability (k − a − 1)2a+1−k21−a, all of the outside citizens except one vote yes and
all of the remaining a − 1 citizens vote yes. If so, f is 1 if and only if at least one of the
president and the citizen say yes. The resulting contribution is (1 + a− k)21−k.
4. With probability (k − a − 1)2a+1−k21−a, all of the outside citizens except one vote no and
all of the remaining a− 1 citizens vote no. If so, f is 1 if and only if both the president and
the citizen say yes. The resulting contribution is (1 + a− k)21−k.
5. In all other cases, the contribution to the Fourier coefficient is 0.
Summing these contributions up, we obtain k−2a
2k−2 , as needed.
D Inclusion/exclusion calculations
Lemma D.1.
1. S{i1},{(i2,i3)} = βS{(i1,i2)} − S{i1,(i1,i2)}
2. S{α},{(i2,i3)} = αS{(i1,i2)}
3. S{i1},{α,i2} = βS{α,i1} − S{i1,(i1,α)}
4.
2S{i1},{(i2,i3)},{(i4,i5)} = β(S{(i1,i2)})
2 − 2S{i1,(i1,i2)}S{(i1,i2)} − 2βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3)} − βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}
+ 2S{i1,(i1,i2),(i2,i3)} + 4S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i3)} + 2S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}
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5.
2S{α},{(i2,i3)},{(i4,i5)} = α(S{(i1,i2)})
2 − 2αS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3)} − αS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}
6.
S{i1},{(α,i2)},{(i3,i4)} = βS{(α,i1)}S{(i1,i2)} − S{i1,(i1,α)}S{(i1,i2)} − S{i1,(i1,i2)}S{(α,i1)}
− βS{(α,i1),(i1,i2)} + S{i1,(i1,i2),(i2,α)} + 2S{i1,(i1,α),(i1,i2)}
7.
6S{i1},{(i2,i3)},{(i4,i5)},{i6,i7} = β(S{(i1,i2)})
3 − 3S{i1,(i1,i2)}(S{(i1,i2)})2 − 6βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3)}S{(i1,i2)}
− 3βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}S{(i1,i2)} + 6S{i1,(i1,i2),(i2,i3)}S{(i1,i2)}
+ 12S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i3)}S{(i1,i2)} + 6S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}S{(i1,i2)}
+ 12βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3),(i1,i4)} + 12βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3),(i2,i3)} + 6βS{(i1,i2),(i2,i3),(i3,i4)}
+ 6βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,i3)} + 2βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}
− 18S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i3),(i1,i4)} − 6S{i2,(i1,i2),(i1,i3),(i1,i4)}
− 12S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i3),(i2,i3)} − 6S{i2,(i1,i2),(i2,i3),(i3,i4)}
− 12S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,i3)} − 3S{i2,(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,i3)}
− 3S{i3,(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,i3)} − 3S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}
8.
6S{α},{(i2,i3)},{(i4,i5)},{i6,i7} = α(S{(i1,i2)})
3 − 6αS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3)}S{(i1,i2)} − 3αS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}S{(i1,i2)}
+ 12αS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3),(i1,i4)} + 12αS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3),(i2,i3)} + 6αS{(i1,i2),(i2,i3),(i3,i4)}
+ 6αS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,i3)} + 2αS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}
9.
2S{i1},{(α,i2)},{(i3,i4)},{i5,i6} = βS{(α,i1)}(S{(i1,i2)})
2 − S{i1,(i1,α)}(S{(i1,i2)})2 − 2S{i1,(i1,i2)}S{(α,i1)}S{(i1,i2)}
− 2βS{(i1,α),(i1,i3)}S{(i1,i2)} − 2βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3)}S{(α,i1)} − βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}S{(α,i1)}
+ 2S{i1,(i1,i2),(i2,α)}S{(i1,i2)} + 2S{i1,(i1,i2),(i2,i3)}S{(α,i1)}
+ 4S{i1,(i1,α),(i1,i2)}S{(i1,i2)} + 4S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i3)}S{(α,i1)} + 2S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}S{(α,i1)}
+ 12βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3),(i1,i4)} + 12βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3),(i2,i3)} + 6βS{(i1,i2),(i2,i3),(i3,i4)}
+ 6βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,i3)} + 2βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}
− 10S{i1,(i1,α),(i1,i2),(i1,i3)} − 2S{i2,(i1,i2),(i1,α),(i1,i3)}
− 2S{i2,(α,i1),(i1,i2),(i2,i3)} − 2S{i3,(α,i1),(i1,i2),(i2,i3)}
− 3S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,α)} − 2S{i2,(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,α)}
Proof.
2S{i1},{(i2,i3)},{(i4,i5)} = β(S{(i1,i2)})
2 − 2S{i1,(i1,i2)}S{(i1,i2)} − 2βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3)} − βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}
+ 2S{i1,(i1,i2),(i2,i3)} + 4S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i3)} + 2S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}
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Figure 2:
2S{α},{(i2,i3)},{(i4,i5)} = α(S{(i1,i2)})
2 − 2αS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3)} − αS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}
×2
+1
−2 −1
Figure 3:
S{i1},{(α,i2)},{(i3,i4)} = βS{(α,i1)}S{(i1,i2)} − S{i1,(i1,α)}S{(i1,i2)} − S{i1,(i1,i2)}S{(α,i1)}
− βS{(α,i1),(i1,i2)} + S{i1,(i1,i2),(i2,α)} + 2S{i1,(i1,α),(i1,i2)}
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Figure 4:
6S{i1},{(i2,i3)},{(i4,i5)},{i6,i7} = β(S{(i1,i2)})
3 − 3S{i1,(i1,i2)}(S{(i1,i2)})2 − 6βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3)}S{(i1,i2)}
− 3βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}S{(i1,i2)} + 6S{i1,(i1,i2),(i2,i3)}S{(i1,i2)}
+ 12S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i3)}S{(i1,i2)} + 6S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}S{(i1,i2)}
+ 12βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3),(i1,i4)} + 12βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3),(i2,i3)} + 6βS{(i1,i2),(i2,i3),(i3,i4)}
+ 6βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,i3)} + 2βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}
− 18S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i3),(i1,i4)} − 6S{i2,(i1,i2),(i1,i3),(i1,i4)}
− 12S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i3),(i2,i3)} − 6S{i2,(i1,i2),(i2,i3),(i3,i4)}
− 12S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,i3)} − 3S{i2,(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,i3)}
− 3S{i3,(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,i3)} − 3S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}
6S{α},{(i2,i3)},{(i4,i5)},{i6,i7} = α(S{(i1,i2)})
3 − 6αS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3)}S{(i1,i2)} − 3αS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}S{(i1,i2)}
+ 12αS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3),(i1,i4)} + 12αS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3),(i2,i3)} + 6αS{(i1,i2),(i2,i3),(i3,i4)}
+ 6αS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,i3)} + 2αS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}
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Figure 5:
2S{i1},{(α,i2)},{(i3,i4)},{i5,i6} = βS{(α,i1)}(S{(i1,i2)})
2 − S{i1,(i1,α)}(S{(i1,i2)})2 − 2S{i1,(i1,i2)}S{(α,i1)}S{(i1,i2)}
− 2βS{(i1,α),(i1,i3)}S{(i1,i2)} − 2βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3)}S{(α,i1)} − βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}S{(α,i1)}
+ 2S{i1,(i1,i2),(i2,α)}S{(i1,i2)} + 2S{i1,(i1,i2),(i2,i3)}S{(α,i1)}
+ 4S{i1,(i1,α),(i1,i2)}S{(i1,i2)} + 4S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i3)}S{(α,i1)} + 2S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}S{(α,i1)}
+ 12βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3),(i1,i4)} + 12βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3),(i2,i3)} + 6βS{(i1,i2),(i2,i3),(i3,i4)}
+ 6βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,i3)} + 2βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,i2)}
− 10S{i1,(i1,α),(i1,i2),(i1,i3)} − 2S{i2,(i1,i2),(i1,α),(i1,i3)}
− 2S{i2,(α,i1),(i1,i2),(i2,i3)} − 2S{i3,(α,i1),(i1,i2),(i2,i3)}
− 3S{i1,(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,α)} − 2S{i2,(i1,i2),(i1,i2),(i1,α)}
46
+1
−6 −3
+12 +12
+6 +6 +2
Figure 6:
+1
−2 −1 −1
+4+2 +2
−2 −2
+4+2
+4 +2 +2
−2
−10
−3
−2
−2 −2
+0
Figure 7:
47
